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DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY MINUTES TO CHAL-
LENGE INDICTMENTS AND IMPEACH WITNESSES
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Since its inception, the proceedings of the grand jury have been
shrouded in secrecy.- Although originally a matter of custom, grand jury
privacy was established as a legal principle 2 in the Earl of Shaftesbury's
Trial. All information, minutes, and other records compiled by the grand
jury were confidential, except to the prosecuting authorities.4 Today,
secrecy in grand jury investigations is almost universally accepted,5 yet
the recurrence of motions for disclosure of grand jury minutes has en-
gendered controversy concerning the propriety of piercing the curtain of
confidentiality which surrounds these proceedings. 6
The reasons most frequently articulated for the policy of closed grand
jury records were summarized in United States v. Rose: 7
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in
its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
18 WGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2360, at 728-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961), McCoRmICic,
EVIDENCE § 150 (1954) ; cf. Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of
Secrecy, 48 VA. L. Rav. 668, 669 (1962).
2 See 8 WimoGRE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2360, at 728-30.
3 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681). See generally, Kuh, The Grand Jury "Present-
inent": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 1103, 1107-08 (1955).
4 FED. R. Camnv. P. 6(e). The prosecutor may use the transcript in numerous
ways. See Lewin, The Conduct of Grand Jury Proceedings in Antitrust Cases, 7
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 112, 132-34 (1940); Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22
F.R.D. 343, 409-10 (1959).
5"Probably there are few authorities who would dispute the need for secrecy
while the grand jury is still in session . . . ." Note, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 382.
There are "those who believe that the grand jury is an outmoded relic and an
anachronism" and "that the secrecy of its procedures flouts the concept of a fair and
open hearing and that its inquisitorial nature disfigures the symmetry of our system
of law," but the state must be authorized to proceed secretly "not only because it
cannot otherwise function effectively, but also because simple justice and a decent
respect for the citizen's right of privacy may require guarantees against public
disclosure." Sherry, supra note 1, at 668-69.
6"The problem arises as to whether there is a reason for the prolongation of
this policy [of secrecy] after the grand jury has been discharged and the defendant
is actually on trial." State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 290, 354 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1960).
Compare the majority opinion in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 365 U.S.
677 (1959), with the dissent, id. at 685. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 454 & n.19 (1961).
7 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954).
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testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those in-
dicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission
of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from
disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there is no probability
of guilt 8
The importance of these factors depends upon the circumstances and the
extent of the disclosure sought. For example, when the grand jury has in-
vestigated an individual's activity and he has been indicted and apprehended,
reasons 1 and 5 become inapplicable although the three more institutionally
oriented factors retain weight.9 However, when the grand jury investigates
more than one person simultaneously, 0 several suspected offenders, appre-
hended or at large, may be either indicted, "no-true-billed," or still under
investigation at the time disclosure is requested. Whenever some persons
are unapprehended but indicted or under investigation, the first reason
militates against disclosure; when some are still under investigation or have
been exonerated, the fifth reason applies, and when all are both apprehended
and indicted, only the three institutional considerations oppose disclosure.
Despite the need for secrecy, certain criminal defendants can effectively
present their defenses only after resort to grand jury minutes and records."
The conflict between grand jury secrecy and the interests of criminal
litigants compels evaluation of whether the particular movant's need for
disclosure overcomes the reasons for secrecy.
I. PRETRIAL DISCLOSURE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
An accused is forced to play with a stacked deck in the criminal courts.
Even though the cards are not arranged by the prosecutor or
judge, the fact remains that any criminal prosecution is inherently
unfair to the defendant, semantic presumptions of innocence not-
withstanding. The defendant is not being sued for some real or
imagined civil debt. He is being accused of a crime against the
8 1d. at 628-29.
9 These factors are categorized as "institutionally oriented" because they relate to
the general functioning of the grand jury and the confidentiality surrounding its
proceedings rather than to the protection of any specific individual. To the extent
that the secrecy of the grand jury provides assurance to potenfial witnesses and
jurors, more frequent disclosure will have a deleterious effect.
10 In addition to grand jury investigation of the common multi-participant offenses,
the grand jury is often used to investigate a general problem area in the community;
in the course of such a proceeding, many indictments may be returned. For a report
of the spectacular success of such a large-scale investigation, see Younger, The
Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 214, 219 (1955).
"1 For example, a defendant who has been indicted for perjury before the grand
jury, or who contends that the grand jury granted him immunity, cannot defend
himself adequately unless he examines the minutes. See notes 137-42,. 170-76 infra
and accompanying text.
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community, an assault upon the status quo. The plaintiff is the
People. The complaint doesn't contain vague allegations drawn
by some lawyer trying to earn a fee, but is an indictment returned
by a grand jury. Plaintiff's counsel is no unknown attorney, but
the public prosecutor. "Accused," "crime," "grand jury," "indict-
ment," "district attorney," "People,"-these are words that evoke
an emotional response. All of the majesty of the law, all of the
dignity of the prosecutor's office, all of the outrage of the com-
munity, is working to the prejudice of the defendant.
12
Confronted by so formidable an opponent, the criminal defendant often
requires all available assistance for his defense.13 The grand jury tran-
script can be an invaluable aid because it often contains much of the
prosecutor's evidence, the names of important witnesses,1 4 the grounds of
the accused's defense,15 or necessary support for a motion to dismiss the
indictment.'
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) states:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than
its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the
attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so
directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request
of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a
motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury.
Pretrial discovery of grand jury minutes in federal courts is greatly cir-
cumscribed. Ir It is usually sought with the ostensible purpose of support-
12 Polstein, How To "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAc. LAW. 35, 43 (1962). See
Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation With Defense Counsel on Problems of a
Criminal Defense, 7 PRAc. LAw. 25-26 (1961).
13 See generally, Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?,
49 CALIF. L. Rxv. 56 (1961); Steinberg & Paulsen, supra note 12, at 26-31.
'4 In the federal courts, the Government is not generally required to provide
defendant with a list of probable trial witnesses. United States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp.
281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). In capital cases a list of trial witnesses must be furnished.
18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958). Many state statutes require that the indictment include
a list of either those witnesses who have appeared before the grand jury or those
on whose testimony indictment has been based. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-3
(1953) ; cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 906.29 (1944).
15 For example, when defendant is charged with perjury before the grand jury.
See notes 170-79 infra and accompanying text.
10 For example, on grounds that unconstitutionally acquired evidence had been
presented to the grand jury. See notes 26-32 infra and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 519 (D. Del. 1950)
(power to grant disclosure "should be exercised with caution"); United States v.
National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n., 61 F. Supp. 590, 593 (D.NJ. 1945) (power
to grant discovery "will be exercised only in cases of extreme compulsion"); cf.
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
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ing a coordinate motion to dismiss the indictment,' 8 but may be requested
solely to help defendant prepare his defense. 19
A. Disclosure To Support Attack Upon the Indictment
When discovery is requested to obtain specific support for a motion
to dismiss the indictment, the movant must overcome both the reasons for
secrecy and the almost irrebuttable presumption of correctness that federal
courts accord the grand jury's return.20  Thus, the motion to quash must
have a solid foundation before defendant's need for disclosure can be
evaluated in light of the reasons for grand jury secrecy.21 The fifth amend-
ment,22 as interpreted, guarantees indictment by grand jury before prosecu-
tion for any federal felony 2 and invites citation as support for any motion
to dismiss 24 Defendants seeking discovery and dismissal have grounded
their motions to quash on four basic theories: (1) the evidence before the
grand jury was incompetent or insufficient to support an indictment; 2 (2)
the grand jury used evidence unconstitutionally acquired through an unlaw-
ful seizure, a coerced confession,26 a failure to inform the accused of his
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he appeared be-
18 See cases cited notes 25-32 infra and accompanying text.
19 See United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1954) (indictment for per-
jury before the grand jury); United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J.
1952) (same); cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958)
(preparation for government civil antitrust suit).
20"[T]here is a strong presumption of regularity accorded to the findings of a
grand jury." Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29, 39 (8th Cir. 1963).
cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. W= 3351 (U.S. April 29, 1963). "There is a presumption
that the grand jury acted on sufficient evidence." United States v. Weber, 197 F.2d
237, 238 (2d Cir. 1952).
21See Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, supra note 20; United States v.
Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. 890 (D. Hawaii), motion for leave to file petition for writ of
prohibition or mindamus denied, 344 U.S. 852 (1952); United States v. Oley, 21
F. Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853 (W.D.
N.Y. 1920); United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), rev'd on other
grounds, 255 U.S. 298 (1920).
22 U.S. CoNqsT. amend. V. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger . . ."
23 See Ex porte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); cf. Ex Porte Bain, 121 U.S. 1
(1887).
24 See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361 (1956); United States
v. Coppedge, Crim. No. 579-58, D.D.C., Dec. 22, 1959 (memorandum opinion).
25 See Costello v. United States, supra note 24 (indictment returned solely on
basis of hearsay evidence) ; Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928) (ho
evidence before the grand jury of one element of the offense) ; Nanfito v. United States,
20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927) (incompetency of wife's testimony before grand jury) ;
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (incompetent and prejudicial
evidence before the grand jury) ; United States v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. 890 (D.
Hawaii), motion for leave to file petition for writ of prohibitio or inandamus denied,
344 U.S. 852 (1952) (unlawful evidence including hearsay presented to grand jury).
26See United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976 (W.D.N.Y. 1921) (unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence and coerced confession presented to grand jury) ; cf. United
States v. Fujimoto, supra note 25 (wiretap evidence).
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fore the grand jury 27 or other judicial agency,2s or the use of the "poisonous
fruit" of an unconstitutional acquisition; 29 (3) the accused was granted
immunity by the grand jury ; 30 (4) the grand jury that returned the
indictment was biased against the accused 31 or proceeded in an irregular
manner.
32
27 United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); cf. People v.
Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
28 See, e.g., Headen v. United States, No. 17154, D.C. Cir., March 14, 1963.
29 It is well established that the Government may not use evidence or information
obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure to locate other evidence, since
the other evidence is the fruit of the unreasonable search and seizure. See Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Somer v. United States,
138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943); cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)
(conviction reversed because Government used "fruit of the poisonous tree," evidence
obtained by illegal wiretap). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Work v. United States, 243 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The traditional
view permitted utilization of the fruits of a coerced confession at trial. See, e.g.,
Watts v. State, 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950) (alternative ground); State v.
Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 Pac. 654 (1910) ; State v. Biauner, 239 La. 651, 119 So. 2d
497 (1960) ; 3 WiGmoRO, EVIDENCE § 859 (3d ed. 1940). This view depends on the
historical doctrine, Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 298, 299-300 (1783), that the coerced
confession itself is excluded only because of its inherent "untrustworthiness." 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 822-24 (3d ed. 1940). However, since the Supreme Court has
decided that "the aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude pre-
sumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence, whether true or false," Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ; see
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), the conclusion is inevitable that due
process also requires that the fruits of a coerced confession be inadmissible at trial.
See People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 436-45, 369 P.2d 714, 725-31, 20 Cal. Rptr.
165, 176-82 (1962) (dictum deliberately establishing state policy); cf. Killough v.
United States, No. 16398, D.C. Cir., Oct. 4, 1962, pp. 22-25 (concurring opinion);
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 3.07, at 148 (1959). But cf. Killough v. United States,
supra at 36-38 (dissenting opinion).
As to the "fruits" of self-incriminating statements, see Headen v. United States,
No. 17154, D.C. Cir., March 14, 1963 (fruits of defendant's allegedly self-incriminat-
ing statements at preliminary hearing) ; Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348-50
(1958) (fruits of self-incriminatory testimony obtained by former grand jury from
defendant).
30 United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 213 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1962);
United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954).
31 See United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (allegations
that grand jurors were inflamed and biased by evidence) ; United States v. Fujimoto,
102 F. Supp. 890 (D. Hawaii), motion for leave to file petitim for writ of prohibition
or manda n s denied, 344 U.S. 852 (1952) (allegation that indictment was result of
bias or prejudice); cf. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (alleged that state
grand jury was unconstitutionally prejudiced by newspaper publicity); Coblentz v.
State, 164 Md. 558, 166 AtI. 45 (1933) (alleged membership on grand jury of person
previously hostile to defendant).
32 See Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3353 (U.S. April 29, 1963) (claimed misconduct of govern-
ment counsel before the grand jury); United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246,
252 (2d Cir. 1951) (alleged improper conduct of grand jury foreman) ; United States
ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1944) (presence of alleged dis-
qualified grand juror, and absence of another grand juror when indictment returned) ;
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (presence of unauthorized
person at grand jury session) ; cf. United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 739 (No.
16134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y 1852) (alleged irregular process of drawing names of potential
grand jurors; no motion to disclose since no minutes kept) ; State ex rel. Reichert v.
Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 73 N.E.2d 174 (1947) (person prejudiced against defendant
used improper means to become grand juror); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541
(1962) (alleged that trial judge's failure properly to examine and admonish grand
jurors vitiated the proceedings).
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1. Indictment Returned on Basis of Incompetent
or Insufficient Evidence
a. The Impact of the Costello Holding
Early federal authority divided on the applicability of rules of evidence
to proceedings before the grand jury. The Supreme Court in United States
v. Holt 33 held an indictment valid although the grand jury considered some
incompetent evidence "along with the rest." 34 Subsequently, in two cases,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized the invalidity of
indictments based solely on incompetent 3 5 or supported by insufficient evi-
dence; 3 other courts decided that an indictment was not ordinarily chal-
lengeable on grounds of inadmissible or inadequate evidence,37 although
occasional dicta indicated that if no evidence were presented,38 an indict-
ment should be dismissed. Then, in Costello v. United States,39 the Su-
preme Court held that an indictment could be returned solely on the basis
of hearsay evidence, rejecting appeals to the grand jury clause of the
fifth amendment and its own supervisory powers over the federal judiciary.
Reliance was placed on the fact that the English progenitor of the federal
grand jury was free to indict on the basis of any information it deemed
satisfactory, including hearsay testimony or the knowledge of its individual
members. 40 More broadly, the Court observed that interminable delay
would ensue if all defendants were entitled to preliminary hearing on com-
petency and sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury. Although
Judge Hand, for the court below in Costello, concluded that "if no evidence
had been offered that rationally established the facts, the indictment ought
33218 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1910). The issue was posed in a procedural context
of review of the trial judge's refusal to permit defendant "to withdraw the plea of
Not Guilty, and to interpose a plea in abatement and motion to quash." To determine
whether the trial judge had abused his discretion, the Court necessarily considered
the solidity of the substantive grounds asserted for quashal.
34 Id. at 248.
3 5 Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927).
36 Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928).
37In extreme cases only, when the court can see that the finding of the
grand jury is based upon "utterly insufficient evidence, or such palpably
incompetent evidence, as to indicate that the indictment resulted from preju-
dice, or was . . . in willful disregard of the rights of the accused," should
the indictment be quashed.
United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853, 855 (W.D.N.Y. 1920). In United
States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 737-38 (No. 16134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852) (alterna-
tive holding), the court argued that to protect secrecy and to avoid delay, sufficiency
of evidence before a grand jury should not be at issue.
38 See United States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. 590,
593-94 (D.N.J. 1945) (dictum); United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853, 855
(W.D.N.Y. 1920) (dictum); United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y.
1918) (dictum).
39 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
40 Id. at 362. See 4 BLAcxsToNz, CoMMENTARms 301 (1809). See generally
Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REv. 101, 102, 118 (1930).
The major objection to hearsay testimony at trials is that the declarant is not avail-
able for cross-examination. Grand jury proceedings, however, are ex parte, and
inability to cross-examine in such a situation is not significant. See Note, 65 YALx
L.J. 390 (1956).
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to be quashed," 41 Mr. Justice Burton's concurring opinion in the Supreme
Court implies that the majority rejected this conclusion. 42 The majority's
rationale should have resolved the preexisting split of authority and ren-
dered grand jury returns immune from challenge on grounds of insufficiency
or incompetency of the evidence,43 because such attacks would require the
trial judge to review the grand jury evidence prior to every felony trial.
At least with respect to certain rules of evidence, such as hearsay or
relevancy rules, the decision is clearly supportable. Rules of evidence
designed to regulate out-of-court behavior, such as the relationship between
husband and wife or attorney and client could be distinguished. 45 Since
these privileges are infrequently involved in grand jury proceedings, in
camera inspection by the trial judge upon defendant's challenge of the
alleged incompetent witness would not offend the Supreme Court's concern
for the expeditious administration of the criminal courts. Further, the
Court might establish a prophylactic rule voiding indictments when such
privileged testimony was presented to the grand jury; this would discourage
prosecutors from introducing such testimony and thereby reduce the volume
of this preliminary litigation. This is not to suggest a constitutional right
not to be indicted by a grand jury which has heard such testimony, but
only that the maintenance of certain personal relationships may be important
enough to justify an extension of these trial privileges to grand jury
proceedings.
41 United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 677 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S.
359 (1956). Judge Learned Hand, who was ordinarily reluctant to grant disclosure,
see, e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), was probably
referring to a situation in which the prosecutor had offered no evidence to the grand
jury. See Cochran v. United States, 310 F.2d 585, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1962). Since
this charge of abdication can easily be verified at an early stage, frequent motions
by defendants on this ground are unlikely.
4 2 1It is possible that the majority held only that hearsay testimony is competent
evidence for grand jury purposes, and thus, since there was much hearsay evidence
before the grand jury, sufficiency was clearly established. But the Court's extended
discussion of the dangers of subjecting indictments to attack on grounds of insufficient
or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, 350 U.S. at 363, makes this inter-
pretation questionable.
43 See United States v. Ramsey, No. 293, 2d Cir., March 22, 1963 (per curiam)
(sufficiency of evidence before grand jury not ground for attack on indictment);
United States v. Wagman, 168 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (same). But cf.
Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (allegation of incompetent
evidence before grand jury investigated and rejected by both trial and appellate court).
44 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) ; accord, United States v.
Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 738 (No. 16134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852); United States v.
Coppedge, Crim. No. 579-58, D.D.C., Dec. 22, 1959 (memorandum opinion). But cf.
Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (apparent adoption of
test for indictment requiring only some competent evidence). See notes 57-74 infra
and accompanying text.
45 In Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927), the testimony given
to the grand jury by defendant's wife was held incompetent on the supposition that
"evidence received before a grand jury must be . . .such as is competent before a
petit jury." Id. at 378. Costello has eliminated that line of reasoning; indeed, a wife's
testimony would be at least as "rationally persuasive" as hearsay testimony. There-
fore, any distinction from Costello for cases in which privileged communications are
presented to the grand jury would have to be based on a judgment that the community's
interest in promoting the particular confidence would be substantially impaired unless
these privileges are applicable in a grand jury context.
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Concluding its rejection of the defendant's argument based on the
fifth amendment grand jury clause, the Court stated in Costello: "An indict-
ment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an
information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call
for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires noth-
ing more." 46 This language could mean that the only grounds for attack-
ing an indictment are illegal impaneling of the grand jury 47 or its prejudice
against the accused.48 If so, the need for pretrial disclosure of grand jury
minutes in support of motions to dismiss is eliminated unless the coordinate
motion to quash is based on bias,49 for the minutes rarely aid in showing
an improper impaneling process. 0 Such limitation, however, raises seri-
ous fourth and fifth amendment problems by precluding motions to quash
on the basis of unconstitutionally acquired evidence before the grand jury."'
Therefore, the Court's holding that "the Fifth Amendment requires nothing
more" should be read to restrict indictment attacks based on the grand
jury clause alone, but not to forbid challenges grounded on other inde-
pendent constitutional claims. Finally, nowhere in the Costello opinion did
the Court discuss motions to dismiss based on grounds other than incom-
petent or inadequate evidence; it ultimately rested the decision on the
necessity for expeditious prosecution of the criminal law rather than on
any absolute need for grand jury secrecy.
However, in Lawn v. United States,52 the Supreme Court used
Costello's sweeping language in another constitutional context.5 3 Defend-
46 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). An unarticulated rationale
of the Court's opinion might have been that grand jury secrecy should be invaded
only when an abuse of the institution is plainly apparent, since recognition of sub-
stantive insufficiency or inadequacy as grounds of attack necessarily entails disclosure
to defendants in numerous cases. See United States v. Barnes, 313 F.2d 325, 326
(6th Cir. 1963).
47The Court cited Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939), in which an indict-
ment was quashed not because of any improper action by the grand jury itself, but
because Negroes had been systematically excluded from the general venire.
48 Cf. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) ; Beatrice Foods Co. v. United
States, 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. W=mc 3353 (U.S. April
29, 1963) ; State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 73 N.E.2d 174 (1947).
49 See notes 143-53 infra and accompanying text.
50 Conceivably, the grand jury transcript might reveal information about the
possible disqualification of a grand juror who had been impaneled.
51 Constitutional rights may be violated when an accused is indicted by a grand
jury which considered a coerced confession, or unconstitutionally seized evidence.
See notes 86-119 infra and accompanying text. And, when a defendant is charged
with perjury before the grand jury, a denial of inspection might violate due process
since he might be unable to present a defense without access to the minutes. See
notes 170-79 infra and accompanying text. Further, to indict a defendant who was
not warned of the privilege against self-incrimination before giving testimony to the
grand jury or who was granted immunity from prosecution for testifying, seems
contrary to the self-incrimination clause. See notes 120-25, 137-42 infra and accom-
panying text.
52 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
5Id. at 349-50; cf. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 131 n.6, 132 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Headen v. United States, No. 17154, D.C. Cir., March 14, 1963. More
probably the Court's lengthy quotations from Costello were meant to demonstrate
that grand jury processes are not easily disturbed, and for a defendant to obtain a
preliminary hearing he must base his allegation on more than mere suspicion.
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ants had alleged that their indictments were based solely on the fruits of
unlawfully acquired evidence that they had supplied to a previous grand
jury which had not informed them of their self-incrimination privilege."
The Court's use of Costello might be interpreted to foreclose even inde-
pendent constitutional attacks on indictments, but Lawn was explicitly re-
stricted to a holding that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in
denying a full hearing and disclosure when defendants' contentions were
based solely on unsupported suspicion. 55 The Court thus intimated that
Costello had not foreclosed indictment attacks raising substantial constitu-
tional rights other than the fifth amendment guarantee of a grand jury on
which Costello had grounded his attack. Although the scope of the oft-
cited Costello dictum is undefined, it should not be interpreted to foreclose
the more substantial grounds for motions to dismiss, particularly those that
do not involve the protraction of preliminary litigation 56 or the discovery
of grand jury documents.
b. Costello and Lawn in Perspective
To argue that Costello and Lawn do not preclude more substantial
constitutional motions to dismiss does not detract from the Court's general
prohibition of pretrial examination of grand jury minutes in any but the
most compelling circumstances. Certainly, this interpretation leaves intact
Costello's more limited holding that federal indictments are immune from
attack for insufficiency or incompetency. Thus, disruption of normal crim-
inal processes by frequent pretrial adjudications of the propriety of grand
jury indictments is avoided without completely foreclosing inquiry into the
types of evidence presented to the grand jury.
This analysis of Costello and Lawn is contrary to the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Coppedge v.
United States.M In Coppedge, defendant's contention, grounded on the
fifth amendment grand jury clause, that his indictment must be quashed if
the grand jury considered any perjured testimony was rejected by the trial
judge whose examination of the minutes "satisfied" him "that there was
sufficient competent evidence to support the indictment .... ," 58 The trial
54 The indictment returned by the prior grand jury had been dismissed for not
affording this procedural protection. United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953).
55 355 U.S. at 350.
56If courts did consider the sufficiency or competency of the evidence before the
grand jury, two factors would cause considerable delay: the necessity of scrutinizing
most of the grand jury transcript and the likelihood of frequent attacks on indict-
ments. Challenges to indictments on "the still viable more substantial grounds,"
however, involve neither a great inspection burden nor a proliferation of motions to
dismiss.
57311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962).58United States v. Coppedge, Crim. No. 579-58, D.D.C., Dec. 22, 1959 (memo-
randum opinion). Defendant may have contended that, except for the allegedly
perjurious testimony, no evidence supported the indictment. The use of the word
"satisfied" implies that the court examined the indictment to see if sufficient com-
petent evidence supported it, instead of following the Costello rationale that an
indictment is immune from attack even if the grand jury heard only perjured testi-
mony. However, the judge may have merely looked for some evidence and actually
discovered sufficient competent evidence.
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court's decision to inspect the transcript implies a misunderstanding of the
Costello holding 6 9 that an indictment is not open to challenge because in-
competent or inadequate evidence was introduced before the grand jury.60
The court of appeals sometimes referred to the trial court's test as "some
evidence," and at other times as "sufficient competent evidence," concluding
that "the District Court applied the correct rule of law ;" 61 but which rule
the court was approving-some evidence or sufficient competent evidence-
is not clear.62 However, since both standards require investigation of the
adequacy and competency of the evidence before the grand jury, they are
equally inconsistent with the rationale of the Costello decision.
63
Apart from this reasoning, the court refused to reexamine the minutes
because defendant's sole claim was that the indictment must necessarily be
dismissed if any perjured testimony had been presented." This position is
sound, for the evaluation of the credibility of grand jury witnesses is a func-
tion of the grand jury, not a trial judge reviewing a record which cannot
reflect demeanor and inflection. Thus, as long as the prosecutor did not
59 The district court, however, did cite Costello for the proposition that "there
is no constitutional provision which prescribes the kind of evidence upon which the
Grand-Jury must act." It pointed out that to hold otherwise would necessitate a
preliminary hearing in most cases to determine the propriety of certain evidence
before the grand jury. The court considered this an invasion of the province of the
grand jury and an improvident expansion of the trial judge's function. But the court
evidently did not consider inspection by the trial judge inappropriate; it examined
the minutes to obviate facing defendant's contention that the grand jury acted solely
on the basis of the perjured testimony. United States v. Coppedge, Crim. No. 579-58,
D.D.C., Dec. 22, 1959 (memorandum opinion). Compare Cochran v. United States,
310 F.2d 585, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1962), in which the trial judge examined the grand
jury files in response to defendant's contention that "no evidence was adduced before
the Grand Jury"; since the indictment would have been dismissible were defendant's
allegation well-founded, the judge's inspection was appropriate. See note 41 supra.
,0 A recent case in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted
Costello to preclude "any judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence before
a Grand Jury." United States v. Ramsey, No. 293, 2d Cir., March 22, 1963 (per
curiam). Accord, United States v. Wagman, 168 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D.N.Y.
1958): "The first ground advanced for dismissal, that no competent evidence was
presented before the grand jury which returned the indictment, inspires not even a
pause, under Costello v. United States . .. ."
61 Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Attempting
to identify the rule of law it was affirming, the court stated: "Thus, even assuming,
arguendo, that the witness . . . committed perjury before the Grand jury, the
indictment must be sustained if there was sufficient competent evidence before the
Grand Jury." Id. at 131-32. The court later returned to the some competent evidence
interpretation of the district judge's holding. Id. at 132. This ambiguity may cause
confusion at the trial court level.
62 These standards are not necessarily inconsistent. "Competent" may mean
other than perjurious, and "sufficient" may connote only a scintilla of evidence. The
district court apparently used these standards interchangeably, for it stated the test
as "some evidence" and in the next sentence, found that standard satisfied by "sufficient
competent evidence." Coppedge v. United States, Crim. No. 579-58, D.D.C., Dec. 22,
1959 (memorandum opinion).
63 See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
64The papers supporting defendant's motion to dismiss were defective in several
respects: two "'statements' of fact" purportedly executed by the alleged perjuror
were unsigned, the "affidavit was not acknowledged, and defendant had not attempted
to prove the authenticity of the signature. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128,
129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
1963]
1164 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111:1154
knowingly suborn the perjury,65 this claim does not rest on constitutional
grounds that warrant preliminary consideration.66 In addition, perjury
before the grand jury could easily be alleged in every case. Therefore, in
the absence of some more substantial argument for disclosure,67 it is difficult
to explain why defense counsel in Coppedge was permitted, apparently by
the district judge to examine the transcript. Perhaps the prosecutor
conceded disclosure 68 because of the protraction of the litigation.69
Defense counsel narrowly limited his contention on appeal, probably
because his inspection of the minutes revealed that any claim concerning
the sufficiency or competency of the non-perjurious evidence would be
fruitless. Thus, the court's treatment of these other grounds was unneces-
sary since, even if argued below, they were not preserved on appeal. This
view is supported by the court's explicit refusal to reexamine the minutes
on the ground that, once defendant's absolute claim was rejected, inspection
was pointless. 70 The court's opinion also expounded on Lawn v. United
05 Defendant apparently so suggested, but the court found this claim unsupported.
Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 131 n.7 (1962). Were such a claim founded
on credible affidavits, disclosure and preliminary hearing would be required since a
constitutional issue is involved. Cf. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942)
(knowing use by state authorities of perjured testimony to obtain conviction con-
stitutes deprivation of constitutional rights) ; United States v. Barillas, 291 F.2d 743
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Smith v. United States, 259 F.2d 125, 127 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Dunn v.
United States, 245 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1957) (per curiam); United States ex rel.
House v. Swope, 232 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
I6 Compare notes 126-36 infra and accompanying text. Indeed, since the trier
of fact is the arbiter of credibility, an allegation that perjured testimony was used
against a defendant at trial does not normally merit consideration on appeal unless
the circumstances surrounding the testimony are especially shocking or the allegation
of perjury is supported by newly discovered evidence. See DeBinder v. United
States, 303 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam) ; United States v. Gantt, 298
F.Zd 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Connelly v. United States, 271 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960) ; cf. Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896,
900 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935 (1950). Although the grand jury
is less equipped to determine credibility than a petit jury because of the lack of
adversary presentation before it, this informality of procedure is fundamental to its
functioning. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
07 The argument that perjured testimony necessarily vitiates the indictment was
apparently rejected on the merits by both the trial and appellate courts. As a result,
had this been defendant's only contention, disclosure would have been foreclosed, for
the minutes could not aid in procuring dismissal on those grounds unless the court
adopted the standard proposed by the defendant. Although the minutes would have
been useful if he challenged the indictment for insufficiency or incompetency, under
either theory disclosure would have been inconsistent with Costello.
68 See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348 (1958) (during trial prosecution
furnished defendants a transcript of their testimony before a prior grand jury);
United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 621, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (prosecution
voluntarily gave transcript of grand jury testimony to defendant, but stressed that
it was not compelled to do so).
69 Defendant was first convicted in December 1958. See Coppedge v. United
States, 311 F.2d 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court of appeals reversed and granted
a new trial because of unfavorable newspaper publicity during the first. 272 F.2d
504 (D.C. Cir. 1959). After a second conviction, he applied for leave to appeal his
conviction in forma pauperis. The court of appeals denied this application and was
reversed by the Supreme Court. See Coppedge v. United States, 269 U.S. 438 (1962).
The present proceeding was on remand from the Supreme Court.
70 After examining the minutes, "appellant does not argue that the Grand Jury
testimony . . . was insufficient to sustain the indictment but rather urges us to
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States,71 stating in footnote that Lawn had "emphasized that an indictment
is not vulnerable to attack because some of the evidence presented to the
Grand Jury was obtained in violation of the accused's right against self-
incrimination, when there is sufficient other evidence which is competent." 72
Only attenuated inference from sweeping language in Lawn makes this
interpretation even plausible.73 Further, the Supreme Court never "em-
phasized" anything on this point, for its opinion is ambiguous. However,
had the Court reached and rejected the constitutional contention in Lawn,
its alternative holding would have precluded attacking indictments on this
ground regardless of the existence of other sufficient competent evidence
before the grand jury.74
c. Costello and Lawn as Manifestations of the Federal
Grand Jury's Function
The Supreme Court's consistent reluctance to examine the propriety
of indictments is shared by some state courts.75 But in New York the
conception of the grand jury's function. differs from the federal approach as
defined in Costello. Although the federal grand jury stands as a barrier
between charge and trial,7 6 its standard apparently is whether the accused is
adopt a rule that the presence of any incompetent evidence or perjured testimony
before a Grand Jury vitiates the entire proceeding . . . . In view of . . . [this]
position . . . no examination of the Grand Jury minutes by us is needed." Coppedge
v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
71355 U.S. 339 (1958).
72 Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 131 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1962). (Em-
phasis added.)
73 note 53 supra and accompanying text.74 Compare Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 196?)
"But so long as the Grand jury itself is not 'tainted' in the sense that it was im-
properly constituted, or that its members were necessarily biased, its actions, if
valid on their face, are valid." On the authority of the Coppedge footnote and the
broad statement in text, bolstered by an overly sweeping interpretation of Lawn and
Costello, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently sug-
gested that grand jury returns are inviolable even when attacked on apparently sub-
stantial constitutional grounds. Headen v. United States, No. 17154, D.C. Cir.,
March 17, 1963. Defendant had alleged that at his preliminary hearing before a
commissioner he had testified without adequate warning of his privilege against self-
incrimination and that "it was possible the Government presented his testimony to
the grand jury." Id. at 2. The court noted that this issue was raised at a preliminary
hearing on a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. Id. at 3. At that hearing,
defendant evidently failed to convince the court of a deprivation of fifth amendment
rights at the commissioner's hearing. If, at a preliminary hearing, defendant demon-
strated a failure to warn, and trial judge's in camera examination was inconclusive on
whether the grand jury used the unconstitutionally acquired evidence, defendant should
have been granted disclosure of the relevant minutes of the grand jury proceedings.
To require any more positive allegation of the grand jury's use of defendant's self-
incriminating testimony is impractical and unnecessary since these motions will be
infrequent due to difficulty of demonstrating a failure to apprise adequately.
76 See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 155 Ark. 142, 244 S.W. 20 (1922) ; State v. Fox,
122 Ark. 197, 182 S.W. 906 (1916) (construing as directory recodified Anx. STAT.
ANN. § 43-918 (1947): "the grand jury can receive none but legal evidence"); see
43 CALIF. L. REv. 859 (1955) for a comparison of the federal procedure outlined in
the Second Circuit's Costello opinion with California law on the subject.
70The grand jury is "'one of the securities to the innocent against hasty,
malicious, and oppressive public prosecution."' Quinn v. United States, 203 F.2d
20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion) (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1,
12 (1887)), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ; see Note, 62 HAxv. L. Rnv.
111 & n.5 (1948); 104 U. PA. L. Rxv. 429, 431 (1955).
1963]
1166 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111:1154
probably guilty of the charged offense.77 In New York, however, the grand
jury is intended to provide a more positive check on the prosecutor by sifting
out cases unlikely to result in trial convictions. 78 New York courts, al-
though cognizant of the problems of extended pretrial litigation,7 9 quash
indictments returned on the basis of incompetent, insufficient, or illegal
evidence. 80 In order to enable defendants to support motions to quash
on these grounds, disclosure of the minutes is granted if the trial judge
determines on in camera inspection I" that colorable grounds have been
asserted in the motion to quash. 82  This more time-consuming process, of
course, offers the defendant greater opportunity to overturn a defective
indictment.
8 3
Whether the possible detriment to the indicted person when indictments
are substantially inviolable and disclosure relatively circumscribed calls
for a more liberalized approach in the federal system despite the potential
delay depends on an evaluation of the policy judgments behind the con-
flicting schemes. The screening function of New York's grand jury reflects
that state's decision to protect innocent persons from the stigma of un-
7 7 "The grand jury system derives from the notion 'that no one shall be subjected
to the burden and expense of a trial until there has been a prior inquiry and adjudi-
cation by a responsible tribunal that there is probable cause to believe him guilty.'"
Quinn v. United States, 203 F.2d 20, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion),
rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ; Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
But see Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 993-94 (No. 18255) (C.C.D. Cal.
1872) (Field, J.) : "In your investigations you will receive only legal evidence, to the
exclusion of mere reports, suspicions and hearsay evidence. . . . To justify the
finding of an indictment, you must be convinced . . . [that] the evidence before you,
unexplained and uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction by a petit jury."
78 The grand jury is charged by statute "to find an indictment, when all the
evidence before them, taken together, is such as in their judgment would, if unex-
plained or uncontradicted, warrant a conviction by the trial jury." N.Y. CODE CPIM.
PROC. § 251.
79 This concern is manifested in part by the rule that affidavits in support of an
application for discovery of grand jury minutes, if based on mere assumption, are
insufficient to warrant exercise of the court's discretion to permit disclosure. People
v. McOmber, 206 Misc. 465, 133 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct. 1954). Compare United
States v. Fujimoto, 102 F. Supp. 890, 897 (D. Hawaii), motion for leave to file
petition for writ of prohibition or mandainus denied, 344 U.S. 852 (1952).
80 People v. Howell, 3 N.Y.2d 672, 148 N.E.2d 867, 171 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1958)
(dictum); People v. Sweeney, 213 N.Y. 37, 106 N.E. 913 (1914) (dictum); People
v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395, 400, 66 N.E. 112, 114 (1903): "[O]ur courts have always
asserted and exercised the power to set aside indictments whenever it has been made
to appear that they have been found without evidence, or upon illegal and incompetent
testimony."
81 "The practice . . . is for the court, if it deems the application to be made in
good faith, to examine the minutes as a basis for determining whether thare is
reasonable ground to infer that a motion to dismiss the indictment for the reason
that legally insufficient or incompetent testimony was the basis of the grand jury's
action would prevail." People v. Carver, 173 Misc. 71, 72, 17 N.Y.S.2d 81, 82 (Kings
County Ct. 1940). See People v. Howell, 3 N.Y.2d 672, 675, 148 N.E.2d 867, 868,
171 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (1958) (dictum that trial judge may read minutes in camera
in connection -with motion to disclose).
82 People v. Howell, supra note 81 (dictum).
8
3 The availability of quashal and discovery on these grounds may induce pretrial
and appellate litigation and perhaps result in overturning trial convictions. However,
because the trial judge has absolute discretion in this area, the opportunity will not
be afforded to plant error. See generally Willis v. United States, 271 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1959); People v. Sweeney, 213 N.Y. 37, 42, 106 N.E. 913, 915 (1914).
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warranted indictment and criminal trial.84 On the other hand, the federal
emphasis upon the need for secrecy and expeditious administration results
from a judgment that the basic function of the grand jury is to determine
probability of guilt, not conviction. Although the federal procedure may
subject a person to the strain of indictment and criminal trial even though
the admissible evidence against him would not sustain a conviction, this
hardship probably does not assume constitutional proportions8 5 That a
substantial constitutional claim independent of the fifth amendment grand
jury clause might warrant the additional time and inconvenience necessary
for pretrial inspection by the trial judge and ultimate disclosure of the
minutes to defendants is opposed to neither the federal concept of the grand
jury's function nor Costello's limitation of indictment challenges.
2. Unconstitutionally Acquired Evidence Before
the Grand jury
An indictment should be dismissed8 6 if defendant can demonstrate
that the Government has introduced to the grand jury evidence obtained
by an unconstitutionally extracted confession, an unconstitutional search
or seizure, or a failure to advise defendant of his self-incrimination privi-
lege when such warning is constitutionally required.87 This right to quash
84 Cf. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804, cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 858, cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807 (1947) : "[A] wrongful indictment
is no laughing matter; often it works a grievous, irreparable injury to the person
indicted. The stigma cannot be easily erased." But cf. United States v. Garsson,
291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), in which Judge L. Hand stated, in denying disclosure
of grand jury records: "Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused.
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted.
It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery
sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." Id. at 649.
85 The Supreme Court's holding in Costello that indictment on the basis of hearsay
testimony did not constitute a violation of the fifth amendment grand jury clause
necessarily determines that the clause does not require a probable conviction standard.
Note 41 stipra and accompanying text. Although apparently no due process claim was
raised in Costello, due process would probably require no greater procedural pro-
tection than inheres in the grand jury provision of the fifth amendment Cf. Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), in which the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment does not forbid substitution of the information for indictment by the
grand jury. Since fourteenth amendment due process does not require the use of
a grand jury in all criminal cases, fifth amendment due process probably does not
require that indictments be based only on evidence that could warrant conviction.
Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953) (refusal to interpolate hearsay
rule into the fourteenth amendment); United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 176
F.2d 579, 584 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 809 (1949) (state's failure to conform
to common law rules of evidence no violation of fourteenth amendment due process
clause); Note, 110 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1009, 1011 n.19 (1962).
86 A dismissal of an indictment may in some cases be tantamount to an acquittal
because the prosecutor decides not to reprosecute or is prevented from doing so by
the now hazy memories of prosecution witnesses. However, even though the statute
of limitations may have run on a particular offense after a dismissal, a new indict-
ment may be brought within the next succeeding term of court 18 U.S.C. § 3288
(1958). Similar provision is made for reindictment if the statute, although not having
expired at the time of dismissal, will run before the end of the next court term.
18 U.S.C. § 3289 (1958).
8 7 For a discussion of the applicability of the privilege beyond the actual criminal
trial, see Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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on the self-incrimination ground has already been established. Although
its extension to confessions and seizure has been suggested only by dicta 88
and may contradict implications in a few early cases,s ° it follows quite
logically from the rationale recently articulated in Rogers v. Richmond 90
and Mapp v. Ohio.9 '
a. Coerced Confessions
Clearly, the admission of a coerced confession at trial invalidates any
subsequent conviction in both state 92 and federal courts 93 under the due
process clauses. The exclusion of such confessions rests not on their
probable lack of credibility but on the premise that "the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system
. . )I ; 15 "that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the
S "[D]isclosure of evidence [in connection with a motion to quash] should not
be made unless it becomes reasonably clear that the illegal search and seizure has
been diverted or used to the acquirement of evidence to support the offense." United
States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853, 858 (W.D.N.Y. 1920) (dictum); see United
States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 746-48 (3d Cir. 1958) (dictum recognizing by
implication the validity of dismissing an indictment because of presentation to grand
jury of unconstitutionally acquired evidence).
89 See United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (considera-
tion by grand jury of unlawfully seized evidence not grounds for quashal because
ample competent evidence was presented). In United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed.
976 (W.D.N.Y. 1921), a motion to quash the indictment was denied despite the
court's finding that unconstitutionally seized evidence had been presented to the grand
jury and the defendant's allegation that an unlawfully coerced confession had been
introduced. The court accepted the government attorney's contention that other
competent evidence had been before the grand jury and that the unconstitutionally
acquired evidence did not form the basis for the indictment. Of course, no contention
was made that the court should establish a prophylactic rule that would vitiate an
indictment returned by a grand jury which had received such evidence. Nor was a
preliminary hearing to examine the individual grand jurors requested-grand jury
minutes had not been recorded-and such a substantial innovation would have been
inappropriate on the court's initiative.
90365 U.S. 534, 543 (1961) (sole constitutional criterion for admissibility of
confession is its voluntariness; reliability is irrelevant).
91367 U.S. 643 (1961) (constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure requires that evidence so obtained be excluded in any court).
92 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9 3 See Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Compare Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371
U.S. 341, 347-48, 350 n.10 (1963) (dictum), with Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
190 n.35, 192 (1953), and 3 WIGmolE, EvmaiDcz §821 (3d ed. 1940).
94The constitutional basis for exclusion of federally obtained involuntary con-
fessions is not entirely clear. Probably both the due process and self-incrimination
clauses of the fifth amendment underlie the reversal of convictions when coerced con-
fessions have been introduced at trial. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
583 n.25 (1961): "[T]he conceptions underlying the rule excluding coerced confes-
sions and the privilege against self-incrimination have become, to some extent, assimi-
lated." See Fraenkel, From Suspicion to Accusation, 51 YALE L.J. 748, 753 (1942).
95 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (due process ground apparently
relying on self-incrimination reasoning).
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actual criminals themselves." 9 6 The fundamental unfairness of intro-
ducing at trial coerced confessions extracted by government agents is
almost as marked when these confessions are presented to a grand jury.
97
Official sanction of such "impermissible methods" 98 by any judicial organ
frustrates the constitutional guarantee. In addition, although these consti-
tutional considerations do not determine whether the grand jury should be
permitted to receive confessions obtained during unlawful detention in
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) 9 their exclusion
would more completely effectuate the McNabb-Mallory 0 0 prophylactic
rule. Further, the coerced confession doctrine-that "defendant is de-
prived of due process by entry of judgment of conviction without exclusion
of the confession," '0 ' and "consequently the conviction must be set aside
... :" 1o2_rests in part on the need to discourage illegal police
methods.'0 3 To the extent that the constitutional guarantee is so grounded,
its protection would be diminished were such evidence or its unlawful
fruit -14 admissible before a grand jury.0 5
b. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Similarly, to permit unconstitutionally seized evidence to be pre-
sented to a federal grand jury would undermine the protection recognized
in Mapp v. Ohio ' 0 6 -that the victim of an unconstitutional seizure has a
constitutional right to have illegally obtained evidence suppressed. Mapp
96 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) (due process ground appar-
ently relying on fundamental unfairness reasoning).
97 "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but
that it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, J.).
98 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
9
9 FED. R. Cui. P. 5 (a) : "An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued
upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner
or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses
against the laws of the United States."
100 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943); cf. United States v. Tane, Crim. No. 61-32, E.D.N.Y., April
10, 1963. See generally Donnelly, Police Authority and Practices, 339 Annals pp. 90,
107, 109 (1962).
10 1 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 210 (1960).
_10 21d. at 205.
103 See id. at 207; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) ; Donnelly,
supra note 100, at 108; cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). But cf.
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
158 (1943) (dissenting opinion). See generally Meltzer, Involuntary Confessious:
The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. Cai. L. REv. 317,
346-54 (1954).
104 See note 29 supra.
105 Cf. United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The self-
incrimination clause requires that a defendant be apprised of his constitutional privi-
lege when he testifies before the grand jury. Therefore, to the extent that the
exclusion of coerced confessions rests on self-incrimination grounds, these confessions
should also be inadmissible before the grand jury. See notes 93-94 supra.
106367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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demonstrated that although Weeks v. United States'0 7 probably was
based on the Court's federal supervisory powers, 08 it could also have
rested on fourth amendment grounds. 09 The Court recognized that over-
zealous law enforcement could effectively be deterred only by rendering
tainted evidence and its unlawful fruits legally useless."0 To leave the
grand jury avenue open would invite continued indifference to the consti-
tutional right involved, as would permitting introduction of any unlawfully
obtained evidence."'
Defendants seeking dismissal of indictments on these constitutional
grounds should have a preliminary hearing to determine whether an un-
constitutional acquisition has occurred.'1 2 This pretrial hearing does not
entail the additional delay which disturbed the Court in Costello, since the
unconstitutional seizure issue would eventually be raised at trial or on
a pretrial motion to suppress under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(e). 1 13 Indeed, consolidation of these two pretrial hearings is entirely
107232 U.S. 383 (1914).
108 The Court has long recognized its right "to deal with papers and documents
in the possession of the District Attorney and other officers of the court . .. ."
Id. at 398. "The Court in Weeks seemed hesitant to hold outright that the admission
of evidence seized unconstitutionally was itself unconstitutional; it spoke of exclusion,
rather, as a remedy for unconstitutional police conduct, and did not foreclose the
possibility that it had fashioned this remedy in the exercise of its supervisory power
over federal criminal law enforcement." The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV.
L. REv. 40, 155-56 (1961). But cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332-41 (1942),
in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter listed a series of cases representing the Court's
supervisory power but failed to mention Weeks.
109In Mapp, Mr. Justice Black, who cast the fifth vote necessary for reversal,
hesitantly joined the decision of the Court, but wrote a separate concurring opinion
in which he argued that, although the fourth amendment alone does not require
reversal and exclusion of the evidence, the fourth and fifth amendments, when com-
bined and applied to the states through the fourteenth, require reversal and exclusion.
367 U.S. at 666. See generally Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling
Constitutional Decsion: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650, 665-68 (1962).
"1o Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) ; 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 127, 130
(1961).
Ill In a recent case, a trial court dismissed an indictment because based on testi-
mony elicited by threats of disclosure of information acquired through an unlawful
wiretap. United States v. Tane, Crim. No. 61-32, E.D.N.Y., April 10, 1963.
112 Apparently no appeal is available to defendant if the judge finds that no un-
constitutional acquisition of evidence occurred or that the unconstitutional evidence
was not presented to the grand jury. Cf. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121
(1962) (disposition of preindictment motion to suppress under FED. R. CRm. P.
41(e) not appealable). The Government could appeal the dismissal to a court of
appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958): "An appeal may be taken by . . . the United
States . . . from a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment
or information . . . ." United States v. Wheeler, 256 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1958).
See generally Comment, The Appealability and Effect of Rulings on Pretrial Motions
To Suppress Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 35 TUL. L. REv. 794 (1961).
113 A finding that no illegally seized evidence was presented to the grand jury
would probably not preclude a 41(e) pretrial suppression motion provided that new
facts are alleged to make the claim colorable; the same analysis applies to a subse-
quent suppression motion at trial. The matter would be subject to the discretion of
the trial judge; at least he would not have to conduct a second pretrial hearing for
suppresson when no new facts are adduced. See United States v. Whiting, 311 F.2d
191, 196 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 83 Sup. Ct 734 (1963); United States v.
Wheeler, 172 F. Supp. 278, 280 (W.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1960) ;
Jennings v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 311, 312 (D.D.C. 1956), aff'd, 247 F.2d 784
(D.C. Cir. 1957); cf. Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 224 (1929); Agnello v.
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appropriate since the factual issues are identical. In a circuit that permits
pretrial suppression of coerced confessions, n 4 similar consolidation would
obviate the Costello concern. Preliminary hearing on the coerced nature
of the confession for dismissal purposes would normally preclude re-
litigation at trial "f5 and would parallel the customary trial hearing before
the judge with the jury excused. n 6  Nor would this pretrial litigation
necessarily reveal government witnesses or render them susceptible to
defense pressure since most of the prosecution witnesses on this issue
would be police officers.1 1 7  The same analysis applies to the self-
incrimination issue which otherwise would be adjudicated at trial 118 or
preliminary hearing." 9
c. Failure To Inform of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In a relatively few cases an accused will obey a subpoena 120 to testify
or produce documents before a grand jury without having been informed
of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Although one
dated case denied a hearing upon allegation of these facts,12' in an early
segment of the Lawn litigation,'122 apparently after in camera inspection, the
district judge determined that the defendants had not been properly in-
formed and that the evidence obtained from them had "at least furnished
a link in the chain of evidence needed to . . . [indict] them for the
crimes charged." '3 Accordingly, the indictment was dismissed as ob-
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
312-13 (1921) ; Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Gatewood
v. United States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (dictum), reversing 109 F. Supp.
440 (D.D.C. 1953). Compare Thomas v. United States, 268 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Waldron v. United States, 219 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Cradle v. United
States, 178 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 929 (1950).
114 The federal courts disagree about whether a coerced confession can be sup-
pressed at pretrial. Compare It re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 331
U.S. 804, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858, cert. disinissed, 332 U.S. 807 (1947) (preindict-
ment motion to suppress granted), with Biggs v. United States, 246 F.2d 40 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 922 (1957), and Centracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382,
387 (1st Cir.) (dictum criticizing Fried), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952). Ad-
missibility is usually challenged at trial under Mallory or the constitutional doctrine.
115 The results of the proposed pretrial hearing on the existence of a coerced
confession would bind a subsequent 41(e) -type trial hearing on the issue only to the
extent already discussed in the context of unlawful seizure. See note 113 supra.
116 Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
n7 Cf. Harrell v. United States, No. 17350, D.C. Cir., April 18, 1963, p. 3 n.6.
118 See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
119 See, e.g., Headen v. United States, No. 17154, D.C. Cir., March 14, 1963;
United States v. Wheeler, 172 F. Supp. 278, 279 (W.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d
94 (3d Cir. 1960). The amount of delay might be mitigated further by the establish-
ment of a prophylactic rule invalidating any indictment returned after unconstitutionally
acquired evidence has been presented to the grand jury. Prosecutors would hesitate
to assume the risk of introducing such evidence before the grand jury.
1
20 Cf. Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 993 (1956) (voluntary appearance without invoking the fifth amendment).
121 United States v. Brown, 1 Sawyer 531 (D. Ore. 1871).
122 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
2 United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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tained in violation of defendant's fifth amendment rights.
124 Had the
judge been unable to determine without aid of argument whether the
evidence supplied had induced the indictment, he should have ordered dis-
closure of all defendant's testimony and statements of the prosecutor con-
cerning the subpoenaed documents in order to allow defendants to attempt
to demonstrate the self-incriminating nature of the evidence. Disclosure
under these circumstances would not frustrate the reasons for grand jury
secrecy, since discovery could be circumscribed and would be directed
to the very authors of the statements and documents.12 When the judge
is unable to make the necessary findings without benefit of adversary
presentation, defendant's need for disclosure to demonstrate his consti-
tutional contention is compelling. Since few cases will involve the par-
ticular facts necessary to qualify for disclosure-the defendant must
actually have been subpoenaed to testify or produce documents before the
grand jury, the trial judge must have found that defendant was not properly
informed of his fifth amendment rights, and the trial judge could not
himself deduce the necessary connection between the evidence so obtained
and the indictment-, neither wholesale invasion of grand jury secrecy nor
opportunity for any serious protraction of litigation would result.
d. A Proposed Procedure
If at the preliminary hearing the movant successfully demonstrates
unlawful acquisition-either the coerced nature of a confession, unreason-
ableness of a search and seizure, or self-incriminating tendency of a state-
ment or document-, the trial judge should ask the prosecutor whether
this evidence was presented to the grand jury;12 6 if the prosecutor states
that it was, the indictment should be dismissed and the prosecutor cau-
tioned that the illegal evidence must not be presented to any subsequent
grand or petit jury, or used as the basis for procuring other evidence. If
the prosecutor professes that the evidence was not introduced 127 before
the grand jury and the accused moves for in camera inspection to deter-
mine whether this is so or whether any of the fruits of such evidence were
introduced, the trial judge should examine the minutes '
28 to determine
whether unconstitutionally acquired evidence has apparently been used to
uncover other proof which was then presented to the grand jury. Of
course, in camera inspection cannot definitively resolve this issue, but if
124But cf. Headen v. United States, No. 17154, D.C. Cir., March 17, 1963.
125 See text accompanying note 142 infra; note 175 infra and accompanying text.
126 Cf. United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976, 979 (W.D.N.Y. 1921) in which
the prosecutor, during a pretrial argument on a motion to quash, stated that com-
petent evidence had been before the grand jury. The judge apparently relied on
this affirmation.
127 See note 29 mipra. In Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958), defendants
alleged that evidence which had been illegally obtained by a prior grand jury was
used directly or derivatively before a later grand jury which had indicted them.
128 This inspection would be authorized by FED. R. CRam. P. 6(e) as an evalu-
ation by the court of defendant's "showing that grounds may exist for a motion to
dismiss the indictment because of matters occuring before the grand jury."
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the trial judge suspects that "poisoned fruit" was fed the grand jury he
should grant disclosure of relevant portions of the minutes and conduct
a preliminary hearing at which defendant could examine the prosecuting
attorneys 29 to determine whether the indictment should be quashed.
130
The decision in the second Lawn ' 31 case is not inconsistent with this
analysis. The Supreme Court there held that a full hearing was not
required for a conjectural 132 contention that fruits of evidence unconsti-
tutionally obtained by a prior grand jury were used by a subsequent grand
jury against the defendant. Although defendant's assertion was probably
colorable, the Government's affidavits in opposition were overwhelming. 133
The lower court had allowed extensive preliminary argument and found
that the affidavits left "no room for an inference that the Government used
illegally obtained material in securing the present indictment . . . . " 1
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion
in denying the full-dress hearing and disclosure requested.135 Because of
the previous government misconduct defendants might properly have been
given an opportunity to sustain their allegations, but the requested dis-
closure of the minutes only would have revealed which evidence was used
before the second grand jury, a determination which the trial judge could
have made on in camera inspection. In a preliminary hearing the de-
fendants could have cross-examined the government investigators, at-
torneys, and grand jury witnesses to discover whether the evidence before
the second grand jury was derived from the evidence unconstitutionally
obtained by the first grand jury.3 6 However, in the light of the con-
129 Cf. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 346 n.9 (1958) (use of affidavits of
all revenue agents "who had conducted investigations leading to the indictment and
by all United States Attorneys who had been responsible for the prosecution of
the case.").
130 This procedure, if adopted, would probably result in the dismissal of relatively
few indictments. The prophylactic-exclusionary rules established by Mapp and such
cases as Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), should ultimately induce some
refinement of police procedures. A rule vitiating indictments when such unconsti-
tutionally acquired evidence has been presented to the grand jury will reduce the
temptation of law enforcement officers to resort to illegal methods. This, in turn,
will reduce the number of cases in which a contention of unlawful acquisition can
be raised.
131 Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
1
32 Defendants affidavits argued that the present indictment was very similar
to the one returned previously after the Government had secured from him statements
and documents which tended to incriminate him. In addition, he contended that "a
revenue agent had implied that some of his computations were based on documents
stored in a room in which the documents obtained from petitioners were also kept."
Id. at 346 n.9.
133 The Government filed affidavits signed by every investigating revenue agent
and prosecuting attorney on the case that none of the previous self-incriminating
evidence had been used, and that an Assistant United States Attorney had specifically
cautioned them to resolve any doubts in favor of exclusion. Id. at 346-47 n.9.
134United States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 232 F2d
589 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd .mb nor. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
135 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
136 In order to participate intelligently in this preliminary hearing, defendants
would need access to the transcript of their self-incriminating testimony before the
first grand jury. In Lawn, the Supreme Court noted that after defendants had
reopened at trial their motions for dismissal, the Government had furnished them
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jectural nature of defendant's affidavits and the conclusiveness of the
Government's, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
conduct the preliminary hearing in this case.
3. Evidence Obtained After Grant of Immunity
A witness subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury will sometimes
invoke the fifth amendment and refuse to testify unless he is granted im-
munity from prosecution. 137 If the witness is later indicted, courts will
conduct in camera inspection on the basis of his affidavit that he had
been granted immunity.l"s This initial in camera inspection is preferable
to direct disclosure because an indictment based in part on evidence ob-
tained after a grant of immunity should be dismissed.'3 9 Thus, any
disclosure to the defendant would be avoided. If, on the other hand, the
record does not reveal a clear connection between the testimony given
pursuant to the grant of immunity and the subsequent indictment,140 the
court should disclose the minutes of defendant's testimony to enable him
to argue that his testimony was self-incriminating as to the charged
offenses.' 4 ' Disclosure under these circumstances is probably required by
due process if the judge discovers a grant of immunity and is unable to
ascertain the necessary connection, since the accused's fifth amendment
rights might otherwise be frustrated. This procedure will result in a
minimal invasion of grand jury secrecy because direct disclosure is re-
quired only when the judge finds that immunity was granted and cannot
determine the requisite interrelationship between the testimony and
a transcript of this prior testimony. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 348 (1958).
Although this reasoning would entitle defendants to a full-dress preliminary hearing
on any subsequent indictment charging an offense arguably related to their initial
self-incriminating evidence, this result might be minimized in other cases by the
prophylactic effect of the rule of the first Lawn case requiring dismissal of an indict-
ment when the accused's self-incriminating evidence was reasonably connected to the
grand jury's eventual charge.
137 See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 2281 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) ; Reina
v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
138 See United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., Crim. No. 21-118, E.D. Pa.,
Sept. 17, 1962; United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954).
1 39 In United States v. Onassis, supra note 138, in which defendants sought
discovery of the minutes, the court stated: "[T]he administration of justice would
be best served if the grand jury minutes were submitted to the Court rather than
to the defendants. The Government has consented to this and I have carefully
examined the testimony which the defendants gave before the grand jury." Id. at 203.
The court ruled that the testimony was pertinent to the prosecution and, since much
of it was self-incriminating, dismissed the indictment against those defendants who
had invoked the immunity privilege.
140 See, e.g., United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., Crim. No. 21-118, E.D. Pa.,
Sept. 17, 1962.
141 This procedure was followed in United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra
note 140. The Government produced copies of the defendants' transcripts to the
motions judge whose order noted that these transcripts "have been examined . . .
and are being made available to [defense] counsel . . . on their receipts, with the
understanding that these copies will be returned to the hearing judge at the time of
the argument on the Motions to Dismiss . . . ." The disclosure permitted in this
case was apparently not very helpful, for the motions to dismiss were subsequently
denied. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 213 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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charge. Further, the defendant will discover nothing new about the activi-
ties of the grand jury, but will merely refresh his recollection about his
own testimony.142
4. Indictment Returned by Biased or Irregularly Proceeding
Grand Jury
Dicta in Costello, Lawn and prior federal cases indicate that one
accused of a federal felony is constitutionally entitled to indictment by a
nonbiased grand jury.143 If an obviously biased grand jury satisfies the
fifth amendment guarantee of indictment by grand jury for infamous
crimes, then the grand jury is nothing but a procedural formality. But
the grand jury safeguard in the Constitution was intended to approximate
the traditional English grand jury 144 which stood between the accused and
the prosecutor as a protection against unwarranted criminal trials.
1 45
The right to a nonbiased indictment does not require direct dis-
closure of grand jury minutes on every motion to quash an indictment
because of the substantial prejudice or hostility of the grand jury. A
detailed showing of prejudice from evidence outside the grand jury records
should be a prerequisite to discovery in order to narrow the ambit of any
pretrial discovery. However, such a standard will not discourage de-
fendants from moving to quash and for disclosure even when it will be
142 See discussion of cases in which defendant is accused of perjury before the
grand jury, text accompanying notes 171-79 infra.
143 Cf. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (conviction reversed because
Negroes had been systematically excluded from service on grand jury). But cf. 111
U. PA. L. Rav. 1000 (1963).
144 "There is every reason to believe that our constitutional grand jury was
intended to operate substantially like its English progenitor." Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 369 (1956). "Undoubtedly the framers . . .were imbued with
the common law estimate of the value of the grand jury as part of its system of
criminal jurisprudence. They, therefore, must be understood to have used the language
which they did in declaring that no person should be called to answer for any capital
or otherwise infamous crime, except upon an indictment or presentment of a grand
jury, in the full sense of its necessity and of its value." Ex parte Bain, 212 U.S. 1,
12 (1887). The constitutional provision establishing the right to a grand jury "'is
so manifestly conformable to the words of Magna Charta, that we are not to consider
it as a newly invented phrase, first used by the makers of our Constitution; but we
are to look at it as the adoption of one of the great securities of private right, handed
to us among the liberties and privileges which our ancestors enjoyed at the time of
their emigration . . . ."' Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 550-51 (1884) (dis-
senting opinion), quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857).
145 English grand jurors "convened as a body of laymen, free from technical
rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no
one because of special favor." Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
The right of the individual to be protected by the grand jury from "'hasty, malicious,
and oppressive public prosecutions [is] . . . one of the ancient immunities and privi-
leges of English liberty.'" Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 552 (1884) (dis-
senting opinion), quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray). 329 (1857). "[lIt
remains true that the grand jury is as valuable as ever in securing . . . 'individual
citizens' 'from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense,
and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established . . . . " Ex
parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), quoting Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329
(1857).
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virtually impossible eventually to prove enough to quash the indictment,
for they risk nothing by such a motion and might obtain the grand jury
transcript.
The institutional difficulties of processing the preliminary hearing in
these cases militates against disclosure.146 Since the most effective in-
dicators of prejudice-demeanor and vocal inflection-are not preserved
in a transcript, the grand jury minutes will normally reveal little evidence
of bias toward an accused. Further, open controversy over whether a
particular grand juror's vigorous interrogations resulted from zeal or bias
is a damaging intrusion into grand jury secrecy.147 Therefore, defendant's
need for the minutes is far less compelling than in self-incrimination 148 or
immunity cases 149 or even in the seizure or confession cases,150 for once
the defendant demonstrates sufficient bias to satisfy the preliminary re-
quirements, the value of the evidence that the minutes might add151 does
not warrant pretrial invasion of grand jury secrecy.152  This reasoning,
however, does not prevent vindication of the putative constitutional right
in the rare case in which sufficient prejudice could be demonstrated to
satisfy the constitutional standard 153 without access to the grand jury tran-
script; the proliferation of motions to quash on these grounds would be
minimized were the minutes not subject to disclosure.
146 Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (motion to
dismiss based on allegation of perjured testimony before grand jury).
147 The second reason advanced in Rose for grand jury secrecy seems particularly
applicable in this context. See text accompanying note 8 supra. Investigation into
possible bias of grand jurors would probably require affidavits or testimony of indi-
vidual grand jurors about the conduct of the proceedings. Such public disclosure
might circumscribe the "utmost freedom" of investigation that Rose characterized
as essential to the grand jury process.
148 See text at notes 120-25 supra.
'49 See text at notes 137-42 supra.
150 See text at notes 86-119 upra.
151 Compare cases cited notes 31-32 supra.
152 In Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3353 (U.S. April 29, 1963), defendant sought disclosure of
the minutes and dismissal of the indictment because of alleged misconduct by the
government attorneys before the grand jury. Defendant's preliminary showing con-
sisted of an affidavit by one defense counsel that three grand jury witnesses had
recorded on tape their impressions that the government attorney manifested before
the grand jury "belligerency toward these witnesses, accusations of lying, threats of
prosecution for perjury, and assertions of the very matter under consideration by the
grand jury." Id. at 37. The trial judge examined the minutes, but found no support
for the allegations and denied defendant's motions. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, adding parenthetically that, although it had no obligation to
do so, it had read the minutes and had found nothing prejudicial in them. Id. at 39.
Although the court's opinion intimates that its inspection and that of the trial court
were to ascertain the existence of sufficient misconduct to warrant disclosure rather
than dismissal, the court was careful to note that "the trial court would not have
abused its discretion had it refused to examine the grand jury minutes." The fact
that the court of appeals had conducted an independent in camera inspection was
"not to be taken as a precedent for thus burdening any court or as a holding . . .
that a review of this kind is necessary or even indicated in all cases." Ibid.
153 Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (concurring opinion):
"I assume that this Court would not preclude an examination of grand-jury action
to ascertain the existence of bias or prejudice in an indictment"
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B. Disclosure To Prepare Trial Defense
1. In General
Disclosure of grand jury transcripts can not only aid attempts to dis-
miss the indictment, but can assist defendants in preparation of their
cases. When disclosure is sought for preparation, the secrecy rule is
virtually ironclad in the federal courts. 15 Since most motions for dis-
covery are coupled with motions to quash,155 the usual opinion denying pre-
trial disclosure speaks of the inviolability of grand jury returns. Thus
analysis of the particular or institutional reasons for grand jury secrecy
is rare. 58
Although the Supreme Court has decided no case in which a criminal
defendant sought pretrial discovery of grand jury minutes for preparatory
purposes, the Court has expressed reluctance to permit unfettered pretrial
disclosure. In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.,15 the Government
instituted civil suit to restrain Sherman Act violations immediately after
a grand jury investigating the same matter failed to return an indictment.
The civil defendants moved for production of the entire grand jury tran-
script under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 because the Government
based its civil suit on the evidence that had been presented to the grand
jury. The Court analogized the strong public policy against disclosure of
an attorney's work product in Hickman v. Taylor'5 8 to the need for
grand jury secrecy' 59 and reversed the district court's order that the
154 See United States v. Wernikove, 214 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ; United
States v. Oley, 21 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); cf. United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (civil pretrial discovery of grand jury minutes).
Many states follow federal procedure and protect the secrecy of grand jury
minutes. See, e.g., State v. Goyet, 119 Vt. 167, 122 A.2d 862 (1956) (grand jury
transcripts are property of state and are for benefit and use of state's attorney; dis-
closure is permissible only upon grant of discretionary court order). Four states,
however, have statutory provisions requiring that before trial defendants be furnished
a copy of the grand jury transcript. CAr.. PEN. CODE § 938.1; IowA CODE ANN. § 722.4
(1950) ; Ky. Cium. CODE § 110 (1958) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 628.04 (1947). These
statutes do not recognize the distinction between the use of grand jury records to
support a motion to dismiss and to prepare for trial. This results from a policy
determination that full and unfettered disclosure to defendants serves the ends of
criminal law, despite any harm that disclosure might render to the functioning of
the grand jury. See Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Ride of Secrecy,
48 VA. L. REv. 668 (1962), which discusses and endorses California's experience
with liberal pretrial discovery.
157 See, e.g., United States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; United
States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 61 F. Supp. 590, 593-94 (D.N.J.
1945); United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); United States v.
Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1920). But see United States v. Popaioanu,
10 F.R.D. 517 (D. Del. 1950); United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.NJ.
1942); cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
156 Many motions to dismiss the indictment, or alternatively to grant disclosure
of the grand jury minutes, are denied because of a finding that the asserted substantive
basis for overturning the indictment did not exist. After such a finding, discussion
of the policy of secrecy is unnecessary. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956); United States v. Garsson, supra note 155.
157 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
158 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
159 356 U.S. at 582-83.
19631
1178 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111:1154
Government produce the grand jury transcript or suffer a dismissal. Al-
though dealing with criminal rule 6(e) in the context of civil procedure,
the Court cited criminal cases on pretrial discovery "10 and concluded that
wholesale disclosure could be granted only in a situation of "compelling
necessity." 161 Indeed, the majority stated that it would order disclosure
only when the criminal procedure had been subverted to obtain information
not otherwise available for civil litigation.
16
The Court's reasoning is applicable to motions in criminal cases for
pretrial disclosure of the entire grand jury transcript.6 4 In the antitrust
area, the need for grand jury secrecy is the same in criminal actions and
government civil suits. 6 4 Indeed the civil defendant may have greater
"need" of the minutes than his criminal counterpart, for the criminal fine
is often considered a business cost of engaging in the illegal activity
whereas the civil injunction would normally 165 subject the company in-
volved to greater present and future inconvenience. On the other hand,
the civil defendant's need for disclosure of the minutes can also be con-
sidered less than the criminal defendant's because the civil litigant may
utilize pretrial discovery procedure to reach substantially the same ma-
160 Id. at 681 & n.6, 683 n.7.
161 Id. at 682.
162 Id. at 684. Mr. Justice Whittaker, in a concurring opinion, proposed that
grand jury minutes should be impounded by the court when no indictment has been
returned so that the Government, as well as defendant, would have to overcome the
reasons for secrecy in a subsequent civil proceeding. Id. at 684-85.
In response to the Supreme Court's dictum that wholesale discovery would be
warranted only when the criminal process was subverted, defendants served the
Government with a long series of interrogatories by which they sought to determine
whether, during the grand jury's investigations of them, the Government had at some
point abandoned criminal prosecution in favor of a civil remedy. After the Govern-
ment was ordered to answer these interrogatories, United States v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 174 F. Supp. 233 (D.N.J. 1959), defendant was granted disclosure of all evidence
acquired by the grand jury following the Attorney General's decision not to request
an indictment. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 175 F. Supp. 198 (D.N.J.
1959). Defendant's subsequent attempt to have such evidence suppressed and im-
pounded was unsuccessful. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 180 F. Supp.
195 (D.NJ. 1960). The remedy afforded defendant in this case differs from that
in prior cases involving subversion of the grand jury for civil purposes. Compare
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 175 F. Supp. 198 (D.N.J. 1959), with In re
April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd o other groutnds
msb nor. United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U.S. 233 (1957). In 1962, the
Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 548 (1962), was enacted in part to offer the
Government an effective legitimate means of acquiring information for preparation
of civil antitrust suits and to eliminate the inducement to subvert the grand jury
process in antitrust cases in order to prepare for civil litigation. See 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 1021 (1962).
163 Under this analysis, since motions for wholesale criminal discovery of grand
jury minutes cannot allege a subversion of the grand jury processes, disclosure would
be foreclosed.
164 At least, the reasons for grand jury secrecy in the criminal area are no less
compelling, for the civil defendant may be able to uncover portions of the grand
jury's proceedings by normal civil pretrial discovery directed to the Government's
potential witnesses, a list of which may be demanded by a civil litigant at pretrial
under Fm. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 33.
365 However, in a recent unreported case, seven executives in the electrical equip-
ment industry were convicted under the antitrust laws of conspiring to fix prices,
and sentenced to prison terms. See ScHwARTz, FRFz ENTERPRISE AND EcoNoMIc
ORGANIZATION 63-69 (2d ed. Supp. 1962).
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terial.066 And since the courts have been more solicitous of a criminal
defendant's need for discovery of somewhat analogous portions of the
Government's case,16 7 a more limited pretrial disclosurei-6s might be
granted within the discretion of the trial court when defendant can demon-
strate a particular need. 6 9 In the usual case, however, the considerations
that favor pretrial in camera inspection or limited disclosure in connection
with certain motions to dismiss indictments are inapplicable when pretrial
discovery is requested. Defendants seeking disclosure for preparatory
purposes can seldom demonstrate a compelling need. There is no prac-
tical limitation on the extent of discovery, and even if one were formulated,
protracted pretrial procedures would delay most major criminal cases. All
of the traditional reasons for grand jury secrecy oppose any regularized
pretrial discovery for trial preparation.
2. When Perjury Before the Grand Jury Is Charged
However, when the defendant has been indicted for perjury before
the grand jury, disclosure of grand jury minutes is permitted for purposes
of trial preparation. 70 In United States v. Remington 171 and United
States v. Rose,172 the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits,
respectively, held that a defendant so charged must be allowed disclosure
of the transcript of his own grand jury testimony. 7 3  These courts
166The Court rejected defendant's contrasting contention in Procter & Gamble
that pretrial disclosure of the minutes would save the unnecessary delay and substantial
costs involved in discovery through depositions. 356 U.S. at 682.
167 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) ; Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United
States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
1
6 8 Cf. United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955)
(limited pretrial discovery of grand jury minutes in civil case). But cf. United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, 21 F.R.D. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1957), prob. juriy. noted, 357
U.S. 918 (1958). But see United States v. Wernikove, 214 F. Supp. 112 (E.D. Pa.
1963).
169 Cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (dictum):
"This 'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings' . . .must not be broken
except when there is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that need
will outweigh the countervailing policy. But they must be shown with particularity."
Id. at 682.
170 Special provision for discovery of grand jury minutes in such cases has been
made in several states by statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. A.xN. § 905-27 (Supp. 1961)
(disclosure may be made, when approved by court, of the "testimony given before
the grand jury by any person upon a charge against such person for perjury in giving
his testimony"); UTAH CODE ANN. §577-19-10 (1953) (same). Other states have
reached the same result by judicial decision. See State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219, 176
A.2d 1 (1961); People v. Kresel, 142 Misc. 88, 254 N.Y. Supp. 193 (Sup. Court
1931).
171 191 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951).
172 215 F.Zd 617 (3d Cir. 1954).
173 Accord, United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952); Parr v.
United States, 265 U.S. 894, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1959) (dictum); Costello v. United
States, 255 F.2d 389, 396 (8th Cir. 1958) (dictum); cf. United States v. Alu, 246
F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951); cf. notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
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reasoned that defendants must have full opportunity to demonstrate that
the allegedly perjurious testimony was lifted out of the full context of their
grand jury testimony.174 Inspection is properly permitted in these cases
because of defendant's compelling need, the limited scope of the disclosure,
and the fact that defendant acquires no new knowledge by disclosure.171
Indeed, due process may require disclosure since in certain cases the
accused would be virtually defenseless without the minutes.17
In Rose, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted the tradi-
tional reasons for denying discovery 17 7 and concluded that they were not
applicable to a grand jury perjury case. The trial judge below had con-
ducted in camera inspection of defendant's complete testimony and ruled
that the testimony included in the indictment had not been removed from
its context and that no part of the remaining testimony had "any bearing
on defendant's guilt or innocence on the change of perjury." 178 The
court of appeals rejected this ruling, evidently on the ground that only
the defendant's attorney could properly evaluate the minutes. Thus, any
attempt to limit disclosure would seem improper in light of the consti-
tutional overtones of defendant's need and the undesirability of a trial
judge's approximating an advocate's role in perusing the transcript of
defendant's grand jury testimony.1 79  Nevertheless, the lower court's pro-
cedure is somewhat instructive and its caution not entirely unfounded. A
preliminary screening is appropriate to delete the names of grand jurors
when necessary and to excise those portions of the transcript that contain
dangerous and irrelevant allusions to the activity of others. The time re-
quired to conduct a pretrial examination is not prohibitive, and the cases
involving charges of grand jury perjury are relatively few. Such an
examination would minimize the dangers of a rule requiring full disclosure
in all grand jury perjury cases, thereby protecting both the system and the
individual.
174 "It is one thing to deny the defense access to grand jury minutes which it
intends to use for the relatively negative purpose of impeaching a witness; it is quite
a different thing to deny an accused access to the minutes of his own testimony
which may afford him an affirmative defense." United States v. Remington, 191
F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1951) ; cf. notes 141-42 supra and accompanying text.
17-5 See text accompanying note 142 supra.
176 The issue being litigated at trial is what happened before the grand jury,
not some collateral issue which would be clarified by invasion of the grand jury's
proceedings. Cf. It re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (Michigan "judge-grand jury"
could not summarily convict a witness of contempt consistently with due process of
law) ; It re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (violation of due process for judge to
preside at hearing on contempt charge that arose out of proceedings of "one-man
grand jury" which he had conducted).
177 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
178 United States v. Rose, 113 F. Supp. 775, 781 (M.D. Pa. 1953); cf. United
States v. Owen, 11 F.R.D. 371 (W.D. Mo. 1951) (disclosure denied in grand jury
perjury case because defendant's other testimony could not have qualified or explained
his positive and categorical statements before the grand jury).
179 But cf. People v. Calandrillo, 29 Misc. 2d 495, 215 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Suffolk
County Ct. 1961).
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II. DisCLOsuRE DURING TRIAL IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Criminal defendants frequently move at trial for disclosure of specific
portions of grand jury minutes for impeachment purposes. In 1940 the
Supreme Court recognized in dictum that disclosure is appropriate in
certain cases.' 80 More recently, however, the Court held in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United States' 81 that defendant was not automatically
entitled to direct disclosure' 8 2 at trial. Defendants had argued that
Jencks v. United States 183 required that once a government witness had
testified at trial, a defendant was entitled to that portion of the witness'
grand jury testimony that concerned the subjects of his trial testimony.
The Court rejected this contention, 8 4 because, if grand jury proceedings
were made public, "grand jurors would not act with that independence re-
quired of an accusatory and inquisitorial body".'8 5 Disclosure would also
discourage the voluntary appearance and candid testimony of witnesses
who frequently are the small competitors or even employees of defendants
in antitrust proceedings.8 6 After articulating these reasons for con-
tinuing the policy of grand jury secrecy at trial, the Court stated:
It does not follow, however, that grand jury minutes should never
be made available to the defense. This Court has long held that
there are occasions . . . when the trial judge may in the exercise
of his discretion order the minutes of a grand jury witness pro-
duced for use on his cross-examination at trial. Certainly, "dis-
closure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it."
180 "Grand jury testimony is ordinarily confidential. . . . But after the grand
jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice
require it" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940).
181360 U.S. 395 (1959).
182 "Direct disclosure!' is here used to denote production of grand jury minutes
without prior in camera inspection by the trial judge. "In camera inspection" or
"preliminary examination"' refers to a. perusal of the minutes by the trial judge,
usually on motion of the defendant, in chambers, without either Government or defense
counsel present.
183 353 U.S. 657 (1957). In Jencks, the Supreme Court held that the defendant
was entitled to inspect certain Federal Bureau of Investigation reports which were
in the possession of the prosecution. The Court condemned the trial judge's practice
of examination in camera in order to locate any possible inconsistencies between the
documents and the trial testimony "because only the defense is adequately equipped
to determine the effective use for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness
." Id. at 668-69.
184 "The important question is not whether these records . . . can get into
evidence. . . .It is merely that they may be produced for purposes of impeachment.
Let us make it clear that we are talking only about records of statements made to
a Government agent. Grand jury proceedings could not possibly be based upon the
provisions of the bill, because a grand jury is not a Government agent" 103 CONG.
REc. 15933 (1957) (remarks of Senator Clark). Relying on these remarks, the
Court concluded that Congress clearly intended to exclude grand jury minutes from
the operation of the Jencks statute, 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1958), and thereby overruled
United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957) (per curiam), which had
applied Jencks to permit disclosure of grand jury minutes for impeachment purposes.
360 U.S. at 398. See generally, Note, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 606, 607-12 (1959).
1
8 5 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959).
186 Ibid.
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The burden, however, is on the defense to show that "a par-
ticularized need" 8 7 exists for the minutes which outweighs the
policy of secrecy. We have no such showing here.
188
Although most opinions dealing with trial discovery of grand jury minutes
for impeachment purposes quote this language, 8 9 the various courts have
rendered disparate interpretations. 190 The one common element has been
their extension of the talismanic "particularized need" terminology to ques-
tions which the Court explicitly or implicitly refused to decide.191
The apparent confusion 19 2 results from a failure to understand that
the Court's language was merely illustrative of its narrow holding. Once
having determined that direct disclosure was not automatic, the Court
merely observed that defendants would have to show something more
material, "particularized," than a bare request. 93 Indeed, because the
Court did not instruct trial courts on the factors which should govern
their exercise of discretion to grant discovery or in camera inspection,
94
it remains for the lower courts to articulate the degree of "particulariza-
tion" required and the circumstances under which in camera inspection or
direct disclosure, or both, are appropriate or permissible.
'
8 7 The phrase "particularized need" was first used by the Court in United States
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958), a civil case in which the Court
reversed a trial court order that defendant be granted the entire grand jury transcript:
"a much more particularized, more discrete showing of need is necessary to establish
'good cause' [under FED. R. Civ. 34]." Ibid. See notes 157-62 supra and accom-
panying text.
-18 360 U.S. at 400.
189 See, e.g., Bowser v. United States, No. 17445, D.C. Cir., April 18, 1963;
DeBinder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; Bary v. United States,
292 F.2d 53, 56 (10th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464, 468 (7th
Cir. 1960) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961).
190 Compare United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1960) (restrictive
interpretation-alternative holding that "particularized need" not met by allegation
that government informer was "disreputable witness"), with Gordan v. United States,
299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (liberal interpretation-finding of "particularized
need" for in camera inspection because government called only one witness).
191 The Court explicitly refused to decide when in camera inspection would be
permissible or required. 360 U.S. at 401. In addition, it implicitly refused to decide
which standards should govern disclosure as a matter of discretion or when production
would be required. It held merely that direct disclosure as of right was not required
in this case.
' 92 Pittsurgh Plate Glass has engendered ambiguous interpretations even within
a single circuit. Compare Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928, 946 (10th Cir.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 631 (1961) (statement that "since no showing
was made of a particularized need . . . we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to order the production of grand jury minutes . . . ." could
imply that production would have been required were there a showing of particularized
need), with Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53, 56 (10th Cir. 1961) (particularized
need must be shown before any disclosure would be proper), and Dennis v. United
States, 302 F.2d 5, 13 (10th Cir. 1962) (necessity of showing particularized need to
obtain even in camera examination).
193 If direct disclosure could be obtained as a matter of right in every case, grand
jury secrecy would be reduced in many cases in which no concomitant benefit would
accrue to the recipient of the minutes.
'94 360 U.S. at 400-01.
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A. Mandatory in Camera Inspection in the Second Circuit
The basic approach of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was discernible before Pittsburgh Plate Glass,195 and its present position 1
9 6
attempts to avoid the vagaries of that opinion and the difficulty of applying
any "particularized need" test. Criminal defendants are given broad
opportunity to discover the grand jury transcript of the testimony of
government witnesses. In United States v. Alper, 97 the Second Circuit
set forth three factors for consideration in determining the propriety of in
camera inspection for inconsistencies in testimony: the timeliness of the
request for the minutes, the necessary delay, and the burden involved in
comparing the grand jury and trial testimony.198  The court concluded
that when the grand jury testimony was so short that any contradictions
would be readily apparent, the trial judge should grant in camera inspec-
tion.'99 In United States v. Spangelet,200 the district court examined the
grand jury testimony of the principal government witness but withheld
direct disclosure since no inconsistencies were apparent. The court of
appeals reexamined the minutes, found an inconsistency, and, although re-
versing on other grounds, directed that when the prosecutor resists direct
disclosure of the grand jury testimony of a witness, he should advise the
court about statements that might be classified as inconsistent.
20
1
After Alper, defendants in the Second Circuit apparently were able
to obtain grand jury minutes when the trial judge located inconsistencies
on in camera inspection, but the judge would examine the minutes in
camera only after defendant requested this preliminary examination and
pointed out "a possible inconsistency .... )P 202 In United States v.
195See United States v. H. J. K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957); United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.
1946).
196Compare United States v. ZborowsK, 271 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1959)
(textual citation to only the dissenting opinion in Pittsburgh Plate Glass), and
United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1959) (same in footnote),
with Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53, 56 (10th Cir. 1961) (strong adherence to
a version of the "particularized need" test).
197156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946).
198 Id. at 226 (dictum).
199The court noted that in camera inspection would not be appropriate when
the witness' grand jury transcript was extensive because the trial judge would then
have to assume the role of an advocate in order to extract inconsistent statements
and the trial delay might be too great. Cf. notes 265-66 infra and accompanying text.
200 258 F._d 338 (2d Cir. 1958).
201 Prosecutorial response to this requirement was probably unenthusiastic. The
Government was chastised in both United States v. McKeever and United States v.
Zborowski for its failure to apprise the court of known inconsistencies and this require-
ment was reiterated in United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563,
571 (2d Cir. 1961).
202United States v. Zborowsld, 271 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1959) (dictum).
The requirement of "pointing out possible inconsistencies" probably referred to speci-
fying the particular portion of trial testimony that defendant suspected might have
been contradicted in the grand jury testimony of the witness in question. Compare
Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd en banc, 235
F.2d 664, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956); note 212 infra.
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Zborowski,203 however, the court of appeals rejected the latter require-
ment: "It offends all sense of fairness to first require a showing of possible
inconsistency preliminary to examination of the minutes by the trial
judge." 204 In United States v. Giampa,205 in which a conviction was
affirmed despite the trial judge's refusal to inspect in camera,20 6 the court
established rules to govern inspection and disclosure in future cases: when
the Government calls a witness who has testified before the grand jury, it
must have available at trial a transcript of that witness' grand jury testi-
mony; upon defendant's request, the trial judge should conduct in camera
inspection and disclose to defendant portions of the witness' grand jury
testimony that contain inconsistencies. In United States v. Hernande,20 7
the court declared that a preliminary showing of contradiction was never
a prerequisite to in camera inspection in the Second Circuit and suggested
that the proper time for in camera inspection is at trial and not on appeal,
since the trial judge is better able to find inconsistencies and appraise the
beneficial effect of disclosure on defendant's ability to cross-examine. The
court held that failure to inspect could not be considered harmless error
in a jury case,208 even were no inconsistencies found on appeal, because an
appellate court cannot adequately estimate the "possible effect of a search-
ing cross-examination" on a jury.2 0 9
203 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959) (testimony of the Government's principal witness
should have been disclosed); cf. Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (in camera inspection granted of grand jury testimony of only government
witness). But ef. Jackson v. United States, 297 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (no
inspection of testimony of only government witness both because of stipulation that
testimony of another would have been cumulative and because defendant had failed
to lay proper foundation).
204 271 F.2d at 666.
205290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (dictum).
206 Had the case been tried to a jury, reversal for failure to inspect in camera
would have probably been automatic. See United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86
(2d Cir. 1961) (decided eleven days after Giampa). However, since the trial had
been before a judge, considerable disagreement arose on the panel as to the appro-
priate disposition. Chief Judge Lumbard, on examining the minutes, found no incon-
sistencies and voted to affirm even though he believed that in camera inspection had
been properly requested at trial. Judge Waterman declared that, although such a
request had indeed been made, he would affirm only after the trial judge had ex-
amined the minutes and certified that he found no inconsistencies; the trial judge
subsequently so certified. Judge Moore affirmed on the ground that defendant had
not appropriately moved for in camera inspection at trial. United States v. Giampa,
290 F.2d at 86.
207 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961).
208 Cf. United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (failure to conduct
in camera inspection not reversible error in case tried to a judge when no "material"
inconsistencies found); United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1961).
209 Cf. United States v. Zborowsld, 271 F.2d 661, 667 (2d Cir. 1959): "It is
not for an appellate court to speculate how much difference the grand jury testimony
might have made in the deliberations of the trial jury . . . . No one can ever say
in a particular case just what bit of evidence might turn the tide one way or the
other." The court's distinction between trial before a judge, and jury trial, as to
the degree of prejudice involved in denial of in camera inspection probably turned on
an assumption that impeachment will generally affect a jury far more than a judge
who has seen many credible witnesses flustered by skillful cross-examination.
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B. Judicial Reaction to Pittsburgh Plate Glass and the
Second Circuit's Approach
Other federal courts have not conducted in camera inspection or
granted direct disclosure for impeachment as frequently as the Second
Circuit. In Herzog v. United States,210 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit denied direct disclosure of the grand jury testimony of two
government witnesses. The court distinguished Alper as involving pre-
liminary inspection by the trial judge rather than direct disclosure,211 but
added that even this preliminary examination is inappropriate unless de-
fendant specifies the particular statements 21 2 that he is seeking for
impeachment purposes. 213 The Ninth Circuit has thus reduced the avail-
ability of in camera inspection and limited the extent of ultimate dis-
closure, for defendant can successfully predict grand jury inconsistencies
only when he has some prior knowledge of the grand jury's proceedings.
In United States v. Coduto,214 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant direct disclosure of the
grand jury testimony of an informant 2 1 5 because defendants made no
particularized showing and failed to specify that the minutes were to be
used for impeachment purposes 21 6 By distinguishing Hernandea as an in
camera inspection case, the court suggested that such inspection might be
appropriate if requested at trial. 217
In Berry v. United States,21 8 defendant, convicted of interstate trans-
portation of a woman for immoral purposes, relied on Second Circuit
decisions in his assertion that the trial court erred in refusing preliminary
examination of the woman's grand jury testimony. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that such inspection could have disclosed no
material inconsistency and that defendant had not shown any particularized
need-the only disputed issue was defendant's sexual relations with the
witness and the grand jury could not have returned an indictment had she
not testified that the requisite activity occurred. Under this analysis, pro-
210226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd en bane, 235 F.2d 664, cert. denied, 352
U.S. 844 (1956).
2"1 The court noted, however, "we are not to be understood as saying that it
would have been error to refuse such a request had it been made." Id. at 566-67.
212To the criteria enumerated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Alper, see text accompanying note 198 supra, this court added another: "The
person requesting the inspection should be required to specify the particular statements
he is seeking for impeachment purposes." Id. at 567. The court explained further
that defendant should apprise the trial judge of the specific portion of trial testimony
that might be contradicted in the grand jury transcript.
213 Ibid.
214284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961).
215 Defendant supported his motion for disclosure of this witness' grand jury
testimony by asserting that the witness was "disreputable." Id. at 468.
2
16Id. (alternative holding).
217 Although the court did not explicitly sanction the in camera inspection pro-
cedure, neither did it suggest, as had the court in Herzog, that a request for in
camera inspection might have been denied. See text accompanying notes 211-13 supra.
218 295 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 955 (1962).
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duction must be denied so long as it is sought to impeach a witness'
narrative of an element of the charged offense. But the court failed to
comprehend that a defendant can seldom expect to extract from the tran-
script testimony that will negative an element of the offense. In this case
defendant's "particularized need" was probably shown since any sig-
nificant discrepancy might provide an opportunity for impeachment of this
essential witness.2 19 Further, the court relied heavily on Pittsburgh Plate
Glass to find that in camera inspection was not required and ignored the
express reservation of the in camera issue in that case.220
This same misinterpretation of Pittsburgh Plate Glass and the "par-
ticularized need" language was evident in Bary v. United States,221 in
which defendants sought alternatively direct disclosure and in camera
inspection of the grand jury transcript. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit expressly rejected the Second Circuit approach and held
it would "adhere to the rule [of Pittsburgh Plate Glass] requiring some
preliminary showing of particularized need before the seal of secrecy . . .
is broken." 2 2 The Tenth Circuit's interpretation prohibits either direct
disclosure or in camera inspection unless defendant had demonstrated
a particularized need, thereby expanding Pittsburgh Plate Glass from an
authority foreclosing only disclosure as of right into one precluding dis-
covery under most circumstances.
223
In Continental Baking Co. v. United States,2 24 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial judge had not abused his dis-
cretion by denying disclosure of the entire grand jury testimony of certain
witnesses who had examined a transcript of their grand jury testimony to
refresh their recollections, after the trial judge had screened the minutes
for inflammatory matter.225 The court based its decision on the Supreme
Court's disapproval in Procter & Gamble of wholesale disclosure 22' and
on its denial in Pittsburgh Plate Glass of an absolute right to production.
2 7
The trial judge had found an inconsistency in the portion of the transcript
219 If "particularized need" is some showing of specific facts that differentiates
the case in question from one in which only a bare motion for disclosure is made,
such a standard was probably satisfied in this case. The complaining witness was a
fourteen year old prostitute with an eighth grade education; the desirability of allow-
ing thorough cross-examination of such a witness would seem apparent, even if some
invasion of grand jury secrecy would result.
2 2 0 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 401 (1959).
221 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961).
22
2 Id. at 56.
223 Further the Tenth Circuit committed the same error as had the Eighth
Circuit in Berry by ignoring the Supreme Court's explicit refusal to reach that issue
in Pittsburgh Plate Glass and applying the "particularized need" test to in camera
inspection. Accord, Dennis v. United States, 302 F2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962).
224 281 F2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960).
225 Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
226 Even though Procter & Gamble was a civil case and concerned pretrial dis-
closure, the court in Continental Baking was correct in interpreting it as a reflection
of the Supreme Court's extreme reluctance to allow untrammeled disclosure. See
notes 157-69 supra and accompanying text.
227 Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 148 (6th Cir. 1960).
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that he had already examined, and the court of appeals conceded that the
Government had sometimes used the transcript to impeach; yet the court
refused to reverse because defendant's motion for disclosure of all of the
testimony of the witnesses involved lacked "the selectivity called for under
the law and . . . [was] in excess of the particularized need occasioned by
the Government's limited use." 22 8 Although the court was correct in affirm-
ing the trial court's refusal to grant such extensive disclosure, the trial
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, should have produced that portion
of the grand jury testimony that he knew to contain an inconsistency. In
addition, because of the trial judge's awareness of an inconsistency, and the
Government's use of the transcript for impeachment, he should have exam-
ined the transcript of the refreshed witnesses' testimony and disclosed
those portions that contained contradictions.2
When the prosecutor presents the grand jury transcript to one of its
witnesses on the stand or reads aloud a portion of his prior grand jury
testimony in order to revive recollection, disclosure is generally granted. 2s
Since the witness will assert that his memory is refreshed by the minutes,
defendant can impeach only by demonstrating that the witness has no
independent recollection. This cannot be done without access to the
portion of the transcript used by the prosecutor. In addition, the chances
are slight that a government witness so refreshed will subsequently make
grossly inconsistent statements at trial. The discrepancies will probably
be subtle, and can be uncovered only through a careful perusal of the
grand jury minutes. Disclosure to the witness in question cannot
realistically be regarded as lifting the veil of secrecy; nevertheless, de-
fendant's increased need justifies discovery of that portion of the grand
jury transcript used to refresh 231
228Ibid.
229This procedure, though certainly not required by Pittsburgh Plate Glass,
would have been an appropriate exercise of trial court discretion. The court of
appeals, although finding no reversible error, remarked that the trial court had
adopted an unnecessarily restrictive view of its own discretionary power. Id. at 147.
230 See United States, v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233 (1940)
(dictum) ; United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 692 (_d Cir. 1932): "[Wlhen the
prosecution chooses to open [grand jury minutes], the time for secrecy has passed;
fair dealing requires that the other side shall inspect them freely." Cf. State v.
Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957) (state's witnesses refreshed their memories
by reading their grand jury testimony before trial); People v. Miller, 257 N.Y. 54,
177 N.E. 306 (1931) (district attorney had used minutes to refresh state witness'
recollection) ; State v. Archibald, 204 Iowa 406, 215 N.W. 258 (1927) (state im-
peached witness by calling grand jury members).
231When the judge or prosecutor has read the minutes aloud to the witness,
disclosure of other related portions of the witness' grand jury testimony would not
significantly increase the invasion of grand jury secrecy; however, because defense
counsel knows exactly which statements were used to refresh and because the trial
judge may have screened the minutes before permitting their use by the Government,
defendant's need is considerably less than when the witness himself has examined
the transcript. Accordingly, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note
230, although the trial judge had on numerous occasions examined the transcript on
the Government's motion and had himself recited selected portions to certain govern-
ment witnesses, the Supreme Court held that this procedure was within the sound
discretion of the trial judge and that defendant was not necessarily entitled to examine
the transcript when the minutes were not delivered to the witness on the stand
1963]
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C. The Ad Hoc Approach of the District of Columbia Circuit
Other than the Second Circuit, only the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has consistently indicated a willingness to
grant defendants access to grand jury minutes. Unlike the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, this court has not established an
invariable trial procedure but requires the trial judge to conduct in camera
inspection when a form of "particularized need" has been shown. In
DeBinder v. United States,2 32 defendant moved for disclosure of the
grand jury testimony of the complaining witness who identified defendant's
twin brother on the morning after the offense, but testified at trial that
defendant was the perpetrator. Although the prosecutor's case relied on
the testimony of this one eyewitness, the trial court denied both disclosure
and in camera inspection to discover inconsistencies. The court of appeals
held that defendant had demonstrated particularized need for the minutes,
but instead of reversing ordered direct disclosure to defendant's counsel
to enable him to suggest to the trial court material inconsistencies that
warranted a new trial. The court noted that, if the trial judge found
material inconsistencies, he should grant another trial.2 3 In Gordan v.
United States,234 in which the Government's case rested on the disputed
testimony of a single witness, the court of appeals remanded to the trial
judge for in camera inspection,2 5 although the court expressly rejected the
Giampa automatic exanination rule.236 Most recently in Simmons v.
United States,2 37 although the prosecuting witness testified to a set of facts
different from those the United States Attorney had outlined in his opening
statement, the trial court again denied in camera inspection. The court
of appeals reasoned that the witness' trial testimony probably diverged
from his grand jury statements 28 8 and that failure to grant in camera in-
and the trial judge had first screened the portions that were read aloud. The
Court held alternatively that even had the use of the minutes been unjustified, the
defendant's "substantive rights" had not been affected since the recollected testimony
had comprised an insignificant part of the Government's case. The Court therefore
concluded on both grounds that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying
disclosure. The exact weight to be accorded to each of the distinguishing factors
in this case is uncertain, but had the actual minutes been presented to the witness and
the induced testimony been of vital significance, a different result might well have
obtained.
232 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
233 On remand, the trial court found no material inconsistencies, and, on review,
the court of appeals agreed. DeBinder v. United States, 303 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
234 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
235 Judge Bazelon dissented on the ground that the DeBinder procedure should
have been applied to offer defense counsel the opportunity to argue the materiality
of any inconsistencies that he might find. Id. at 119. The trial court then found
no significant inconsistencies and was affirmed by the court of appeals. Gordan v.
United States, 313 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Judge Bazelon persisted in his dissent
on the ground that he had located inconsistencies and that the defendant should have
been given an opportunity to argue whether they were material. Id. at 585.
236 Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117, 118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
237 308 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
28Id. at 325.
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spection was erroneous, but affirmed because the witness had already been
impeached and any material inconsistencies would have been cumulative.23 9
The court stated in dictum that a request for in camera examination must
be granted whenever the trial testimony of an important government wit-
ness appears to have contradicted his grand jury testimony; 240 and if in-
spection reveals inconsistencies,241 direct disclosure must be granted.
D. Evaluation of the Various Procedures
Although Pittsburgh Plate Glass did not preclude direct disclosure
of the grand jury testimony of a government witness,242 trial courts have
invariably 24 denied it,244 and appellate courts have been unwilling to
reverse this exercise of discretion.2 45  Because the preliminary examination
239 Accord, Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894, 903 (5th Cir. 1959), revld on
other grounds, 363 U.S. 370 (1960) (refusal to require disclosure on ground that
inconsistencies had already been clearly shown at trial) ; United States v. H. 3. K.
Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957) (similar
grounds). But cf. United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1961)
(dictum). Compare Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1962), with
Harrell v. United States, No. 17350, D.C. Cir., April 18, 1963 (rejected trial court
finding that inconsistencies would be cumulative until trial court had itself inspected
minutes).
240 "This does not imply that a showing of probable inconsistency is required
in all cases." Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324, 325 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
In United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959), the Second Circuit had
articulated substantially the same standard:
Even if there were no showing of possible inconsistency in the testimony
of a witness . . . in any case, where the testimony of such witness is the
only direct evidence against the defendant and no valid reason for secrecy
exists, the court should upon request examine the grand jury minutes of
such a witness for possible inconsistencies.
Id. at 666. This attempted guideline evidently proved inadequate, for in Giampa
and Hernaides, in which in camera inspection had been denied below, the court felt
constrained to establish an absolute requirement of preliminary examination in all
cases.
241 Presumably, disclosure of any inconsistent statement should be allowed.
Material or significant inconsistency is the standard for reversal for new trial, not
for grant of disclosure initially.
242 It would probably be improper to grant direct disclosure without some prior
showing by the movant. See note 193 mrpra and accompanying text.
243 No case has been found which has permitted such general production without
prior in camera inspection, but since this issue could not be appealed, the textual state-
ment must be qualified to the extent that this direct disclosure may have been
granted by a trial court without opinion and without subsequent citation in any
reported opinion.
244 But cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 19 F.R.D. 122 (D.N.J.
1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (civil case); cf. DeBinder v. United States, 292
F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961), in which the court of appeals ordered the trial court to
disclose to defendant the testimony of the sole government witness. Although neither
the trial nor appellate court conducted in camera inspection prior to this production
order, the disclosure was not granted initially by a trial court and the purpose of this
order was to enable defense counsel to argue the prejudicial nature of the district
court's refusal to inspect and disclose at trial; moreover, this exact procedure has
not been followed subsequently. See Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); note 235 supra. Compare United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d
Cir. 1959); United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959).
245 E.g., Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960);
Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959), reeld on other grounds, 363
U.S. 370 (1960) ; Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.), aff'd en banc,
235 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
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forestalls the possibility that discovery will be allowed when the minutes
could not serve any impeachment function, in camera inspection is a more
desirable procedure than direct disclosure of a witness' entire grand jury
testimony. The various standards of "particularized need" that the
federal courts have gleaned from Pittsburgh Plate Glass depend more on
the trial judge's predilections about the role of secrecy than any objective
evaluation of defendant's need. Furthermore, since some courts may
have interpreted Pittsburgh Plate Glass as holding that a showing of
"particularized need" entitles a defendant to direct production,246 they
might be more reluctant to find such a need. On the other hand, the
practice of in camera inspection provides an opportunity to limit discovery
to material portions of the transcript and may induce more liberal dis-
closure, because defendant's needs can be satisfied without any unnecessary
invasion of grand jury secrecy. 4 Thus, many motions for disclosure
have included a request for prior in camera examination of the minutes
by the trial judge to reveal inconsistencies between the transcript and the
witness' trial testimony.
Assuming that in camera inspection for this purpose is efficacious 249
and will produce no harmful side effects, the Giampa view is more desirable
than the ad hoc approach of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.2 50 It consistently and expeditiously provides a defend-
246See analysis of Travis v. United States posited in note 192 supra; cf.
DeBinder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (showing of particularized
need entitled defendant to in camera inspection).
247 Cf. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405-07 (1959)
(dissenting opinion discussing inapplicability of secrecy rationales).
248 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962); Jackson v.
United States, 297 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United States v. Hernandez, 290
F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961). But see Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395 (1959); United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961) (alternative holding); Parr v. United States, 265
F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955).
249 But see text accompanying notes 264-67 infra.
250 Despite the differences in practice to be discussed in text, significant simi-
larities are discernible between the appellate practice in the two circuits. In United
States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1959), after the trial judge had
conducted an in camera examination and had granted only limited disclosure, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit itself inspected the minutes and reversed
because it found inconsistencies that might have produced a "material" or "important"
effect on the jury. Compare United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 665 (2d
Cir. 1959), in which the court reversed because it found "important" inconsistencies.
The Second Circuit has not yet faced the in-between case in which inconsistencies
found were not dearly "material" or "important," but it appears unlikely that it
would reverse for minor variances. In United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2(
Cir. 1961), Chief Judge Lumbard examined the minutes and voted against reversal
since he found no inconsistencies; he did not intimate how material the inconsistencies
would have to be to warrant reversal.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will ap-
parently not reverse a trial court denial of disclosure after in camera inspection unless
it determines on its own inspection that the transcript contains material inconsis-
tencies. In both Gordan and DeBinder, the court of appeals held that the district
court had erred in failing to inspect in camera; but rather than reverse unnecessarily,
it remanded ,for a determination of whether the minutes contained "material" or
"significant" inconsistencies. In both cases the trial court found none and was
affirmed on appeal. Gordan v. United States, 313 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
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ant with material necessary for impeachment purposes. Because of the
automatic examination rule, a defendant in the Second Circuit is usually
assured of direct and immediate disclosure at trial if the minutes contain
any substantial contradictions; this procedure should virtually eliminate
litigation on the propriety of refusals to grant in camera inspection.251
Because the transcript is prepared and held available by the Government at
trial, the trial judge will not deny inspection because of the delay necessary
to secure transcription of the minutes. Further, because the preliminary
examination is conducted at trial and not upon remand from the court
of appeals, the trial judge is more sensitive to inconsistencies than at a
later inspection, since the degree of inconsistency needed to obtain im-
mediate disclosure is lower than that required to secure reversal after initial
refusal to inspect in camera. On the other hand, although the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit probably will never find an
abuse of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary inspection, neither has
it required such examination in all cases,2 5 2 although in fact it generally
disapproves denials to inspect in camera 25 3  When a district court denies
in camera inspection in the District of Columbia Circuit, some defendants
may be effectively foreclosed from discovery 2 54 that should have been
granted at trial.2 55 Or defendants may be required to suffer the delay and
unnecessary expense of two appeals 258 before securing minutes that
should have been granted initially at trial.
DeBinder v. United States, 303 F2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1962). It seems clear that had
the trial courts initially conducted in camera examinations and denied direct dis-
closure, a finding of "material" or "significant" inconsistencies would have been
prerequisite to a reversal.
In addition, both courts have indicated in cases involving trial court denials
of preliminary inspection that they might not reverse if the witness involved had
already been thoroughly discredited, even should appellate litigation reveal material
inconsistencies. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324, 325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 969 (1957); accord, Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894, 903 (5th Cir.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 363 U.S. 370 (1960); cf. Harrell v. United States,
No. 17350, D.C. Cir., April 18, 1963 (remanding for trial court to determine
cumulativeness only after inspection of minutes). But see United States v. Zborowski,
271 F.2d 661, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1959).
251 If trial judges follow the directive of Giampa and Hernandez and grant in
camera inspection automatically, the only grounds for appeal will be that the trial
judge erroneously concluded that there were no inconsistencies.
252 See text accompanying note 236 supra.
255 See Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Gordan v.
United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962); DeBinder v. United States, 292
F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961). But see Jackson v. United States, 297 F.2d 195 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
254 See cases cited note 253 supra.
255 Cf. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (in camera
inspection erroneously denied; not clear whether disclosure would have properly been
granted had such initial inspection been held); Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d
117 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (same); DeBinder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C.
Cir. 1961) (same).
256The first appeal would be to obtain in camera inspection, see Harrell v.
United States, No. 17350, D.C. Cir., April 18, 1963; Gordan v. United States, 299
F2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962); DeBinder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir.
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The approach adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
also minimizes the incentive to plant error 25 7 by providing the trial courts
with clearcut guidelines. 58 Under Giampa, new trials are ordered on
grand jury discovery grounds only 259 in the rare case in which the court
of appeals is able to find in the undisclosed minutes important incon-
sistencies ignored by the trial judge.28 0 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, however, in addition to the possibility of
ordering a new trial for failure to grant disclosure after trial court in
camera inspection,2 61 will also remand for failure to grant preliminary
examination.26 2  Despite this court's reluctance to order a new trial un-
necessarily,263 the possibility exists that more reversals will be handed
down in the District of Columbia Circuit than in the Second. If any
material or significant inconsistencies are revealed on remand, a new trial
will be required, whereas had the trial judge inspected initially, he would
have found the inconsistencies and granted disclosure. Moreover, de-
fendants will invariably move for in camera inspection by the trial court
since they have nothing to lose. If their motion is granted they may
receive part of the grand jury transcript; if it is denied, they may obtain
a reversal on appeal.
Despite its superiority to practice in other circuits, the Second Cir-
cuit's procedure is nevertheless subject to serious criticism.2  In camera in-
spection to uncover inconsistencies requires both trial and appellate judges
to approximate the advocatory role of the defense counsel; 2 65 this
1961), the second to review the district court should it then refuse to grant a new
trial because it found no important inconsistencies. See Gordan v. United States,
313 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (no significant inconsistencies) ; DeBinder v. United
States, 303 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (no material inconsistencies).
257 Compare the majority opinion in Willis v. United States, 271 F.2d 477, 480
(D.C. Cir. 1959), with the dissent, id. at 483-85, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 964 (1960)
(dispute over efficacy of rewarding planted error with a reversal).
258 See United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961).
259 But cf. United States v. Hernandez, supra note 258, in which the court of
appeals held that failure to conduct in camera inspection in a jury case was per se
reversible error. See notes 207-09, 251 supra and accompanying texts.
260 United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1959); cf. United
States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1959) (pre-Giampa case in which
trial court denied in camera inspection). See also United States v. H.J.K. Theatre
Corp., 236 F.2d 502, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957).
261 It has never done so. See Gordan v. United States, 313 F.2d 582 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) ; DeBinder v. United States, 303 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
262 See cases cited note 256 supra.
263 See Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962); DeBinder v.
United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961); cf. Simmons v. United States, 308
F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
264 The discussion which follows in text is a criticism of in camera inspection in
general, and to the extent that this procedure is used by trial courts in the District
of Columbia Circuit, applies to that circuit as well.
265 "[I]nspection by the trial judge . . . has serious drawbacks .... [and]
imposing this task on the Judge as regular procedure would draw him too deeply into
the partisan task of preparing the cross-examination." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 260 F.2d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). See
also Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd en bane, 235
F.2d 664 (1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956).
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temporary bias may later adversely affect the objectivity of the judge.
Furthermore, the usual inconsistencies are not the blatant ones which the
trial judge will undoubtedly uncover, but the subtle inferences and im-
plications more easily discerned by defense counsel.2 66 Some potentially
vital inconsistencies will be overlooked by the trial court and a fortiori by
the court of appeals which is less familiar with the record. In addition,
this in camera procedure requires both trial judge and defense attorney
to examine the minutes with great care before impeachment can occur;
this delay reduces the impact of the resulting cross-examination.2 67
E. Proposed Procedure for Trial Disclosure
None of the procedures currently in operation in the federal courts is
completely satisfactory to process defendant's motion for trial discovery of
grand jury minutes. The most feasible solution is that of Mr. Justice
Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass,2 68 concurred in by three other
Justices,269 and, in view of the majority's narrow interpretation of the
issued posed, an arguably consistent extension of the opinion of the
Court.2 70 Neither the majority nor dissent had to decide what foundation
a defendant must establish on motions for discovery because defendant had
made an adequate demonstration. 27' However, defendants should be re-
quired to ascertain on cross-examination whether the witness whose grand
268 "Because only the defense is adequately equipped to determine the effective
use [of reports] for purpose of discrediting the Government's witness and thereby
furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to see them to
determine what use may be made of them." Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
668-69 (1957).
267 The Giampa rule mitigates this delay by requiring the prosecution to prepare
and make available at trial the entire transcript of the grand jury testimony of its
trial witnesses. United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1961).
268 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 401-10 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
2 69 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas.
270 The majority and dissenting opinions did not disagree on fundamentals; they
both considered it unwise to require a prior showing of inconsistency before any
disclosure would be permitted. They differed only on the exact nature of defendant's
trial court request. The majority, in interpreting defendant's motion for disclosure
as an assertion of an absolute "right" to examine the transcript, posed the sole issue
for decision as whether defendant had such a right, 360 U.S. at 398, and held that
he did not. The dissent, however, stressed the fact that defendant had moved for
only the witness' grand jury testimony "regarding the subjects to which he has testi-
fied on direct examination." Id. at 402. This motion, reasoned Mr. Justice Brennan,
"necessarily implied a request that the trial judge inspect the grand jury minutes
and turn over to the defense only those parts dealing with [the witness'] testimony
on the same subject matter as his trial testimony." Ibid. The majority countered
this interpretation by pointing out that it was not contested by either the Govern-
ment or defendant that the witness' trial and grand jury testimony had "related
to 'the same general subject matter' . . . ." 360 U.S. at 398 n.2. The dissent's
position, although perhaps reading more into defendant's motion than was intended
by the movant, is not untenable, and enabled Justice Brennan to reach several
important discovery issues. The majority view, on the other hand, although quite
restrictive, may have been dictated by a desire to leave to the lower federal courts
experimental formulations of various tests in order to prepare the Supreme Court
to decide the more practical issue at a later date.
271 Id. at 398. The principal witness had responded to defense counsel's cross-
examination that he had testified before the grand jury and that his grand jury testi-
mony had related to the topic under trial consideration.
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jury transcript they are seeking testified before the grand jury about "the
same general subject matter" s2 covered by his trial testimony. If a de-
fendant for some reason does not move for in camera inspection, the
holding of Pittsburgh Plate Glass should not foreclose a trial court from
construing a motion for disclosure of the grand jury testimony of a
government witness as a request for preliminary examination by the
trial court. The trial court can then limit discovery to that portion of the
transcript that contains statements not clearly irrelevant to the witness'
trial testimony. 73 In addition, Pittsburgh Plate Glass should have placed
trial judges on notice to give assistance to defense counsel in trying to
secure disclosure that defendants may need badly. 74
The trial judge in his inspection might delete the names of any grand
jurors interjecting questions and also the specific text of their questions
or declarations if they reveal matters irrelevant to the particular witness'
trial testimony.2m- Further, the names of persons unrelated to the specific
context of the trial testimony in question might also be excised by the
trial judge before disclosure. 2 76 These precautions eliminate any impair-
ment of the policies underlying grand jury secrecy 2 77 except the possi-
bility that this general disclosure might reduce the planned "irresponsi-
bility" and informality that has always characterized grand jury
proceedings.278 Were a witness aware that his grand jury statements
272 Ibid.
273 But see Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 148 (6th
Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Killian, 275 F.2d 561, 572 (7th Cir. 1960), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
274 Cf. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92-98 (1961).
275 This proposal seems to follow logically from the dissent's reasoning. See
360 U.S. at 407.
276 If the witness has already mentioned names at trial, additional disclosure in
his grand jury testimony will not serve to discourage witnesses from speaking
candidly before grand juries, nor will it add to whatever prejudice has been suffered
by the named person.
27 7 Mr. Justice Brennan outlined four reasons for grand jury secrecy and con-
cluded that they could have no applicability when disclosure was limited to grand jury
testimony on the same subject as the trial testimony. 360 U.S. at 405-07. Accord,
State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960), in which the New Mexico
Supreme Court in dictum analyzed disclosure at trial for impeachment purposes in
terms of the traditional reasons for grand jury secrecy, and concluded that the only
arguably applicable rationale might be the essentiality of secrecy to encourage com-
plainants and witnesses to testify willingly and candidly before grand juries without
fear of discomfort should their testimony be disclosed. The Court found this argu-
ment unconvincing:
[T]he secrecy is only temporary or provisional, and . . . were it more, it
would create an opportunity for abuse. In any event, once the witness has
testified publicly at the criminal trial, any privilege that he had with respect
to his testimony on the same subject before the grand jury is lost. If the
witness' testimony is the same in both instances, he cannot be subjected to
any more discomfort or retaliation than he would have if he had testified only
at the public trial. However, if his testimony varies to any considerable
degree, he has forfeited the right to any claim of privilege.
Id. at 290, 354 P.2d at 1004.
278 This informality is evidenced by the fact that hearsay and other technically
incompetent evidence is admissible before the grand jury. See Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956) ; note 9 supra; notes 39-40 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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would later be made public or used to impeach any subsequent trial testi-
mony, he might be less willing to engage in the kind of open-ended
testimony that so often reveals highly probative material. The merit of
this argument, although subject to rebuttal,279 may be conceded without
denying the efficiency of this procedure, for its virtues outweigh this one
possible drawback.230  This procedure would almost invariably and im-
mediately provide a defendant with the portions of the transcript that he
needs to impeach a government witness.281 Appellate litigation on this
issue can be narrowed to examination of the minutes by the court of
appeals to review the trial court's determination of the nexus between
grand jury and trial testimony.2s2  Reversals would be unlikely because
deference would be paid to the trial judge's familiarity with the record
below. Nor would the trial judge have to assume the advocate's posture
to make this determination,m at least not to the extent necessary to
determine inconsistencies; neither would he be deciding an issue on
which his decision could be influenced by his personal preferences for the
venerated secrecy doctrine. Finally, the task of uncovering contradic-
tions between the witness' trial and grand jury testimony would be im-
posed on the defendant's counsel, who is best qualified to perform this
specialized operation.2 8 4
III. CONCLUSION
Although the federal courts have been reluctant to grant disclosure
of grand jury minutes at pretrial and trial, the present state of Supreme
Court adjudication does not require this restraint. Indeed, consistent
with the current progress of constitutional law, a defendant should be
granted disclosure of the grand jury transcript when the minutes contain
information required to demonstrate that an indictment should be dis-
missed on independent constitutional grounds. To read Costello and Lawn
279 The factor opposing the desirability of a free-wheeling, "irresponsible" grand
jury is that if no checks are maintained, witnesses might be truly irresponsible and
unfounded accusations and unsupported charges might abound.
280 The prior examination required of the trial judge need be only cursory; con-
sequently, assuming that the minutes hail already been transcribed as under the Sec-
ond Circuit's requirement, the delay would be reduced and the impact of cross-
examination correlatively increased. See note 267 supra. More basically,
It is the policy of the law that the true purpose of a criminal trial is the ascer-
tainment of the facts. The state has no interest in denying the accused access
to all evidence that can throw light on the issues in the case, and, in par-
ticular, the state should hiave no interest in convicting on the testimony of
witnesses who have not been as rigidly cross-examined and as thoroughly im-
peached as the evidence permits.
State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 292, 354 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1960).
281 Indeed, such disclosure might have been granted in either the Second or
District of Columbia Circuits.
2 The scope of the review would necessarily be narrow since generally the
trial court will be in a better position to evaluate pertinency than an appellate court.
283 The judge would be required to consider little more than relevancy with
perhaps an eye toward possible inconsistencies.
284 See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 409-10
(1959) (dissenting opinion) ; Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957).
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as foreclosing these substantial constitutional challenges to indictments
frustrates complete realization of preeminent constitutional rights. Fur-
ther, the holding of Pittsburgh Plate Glass should be limited to the issue
presented in that case, thereby allowing the lower federal courts to pre-
scribe the appropriate circumstances for discovery of grand jury minutes
at trial. After a government witness has testified and a proper foundation
has been established for a motion to disclose, the trial judge should inspect
the grand jury transcript concerned and, if advisable, excise the names of
grand jurors or third parties from the testimony. This procedure should
provide a workable and effective apparatus for granting disclosure when
defendant seeks to impeach a government witness.
Edward M. Glickman
